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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith offered his views on tax fair-
ness.  “The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the 
support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to 
their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which 
they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.”2  This view 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. 
 1 LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER’S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 464 (William 
Morrow & Co. 1977). 
 2 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 498 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776).  Smith 
also offered three other observations about fair tax systems: 
     II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be cer-
tain, and not arbitrary.  The time of payment, the manner of payment, 
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that fairness requires a proportional link between tax and taxpayer 
income is known as the benefit principle.3  It and other views of tax 
equity, including the equal sacrifice principle, the standard of living 
principle, and the ability to pay principle, can be seen as subordinate 
to a superior tax fairness structure that is comprised of two fairness 
norms.  That structure is known collectively as vertical and horizontal 
equity.4  These two tax fairness principles are corollaries of each 
other:5
First, we can postulate a kind of bedrock notion of tax fairness, 
called horizontal equity, which yields the following maxim: like-
situated taxpayers should be taxed the same.  It’s hard to disagree with 
that. 
 Now, if some people are like-situated, the rest must be differ-
ently situated, and it cannot be correct to say that people who are 
differently situated (relative to me) should be taxed the same as 
the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contribu-
tor, and to every other person. . . . 
     III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in 
which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. . . . 
     IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to 
keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and 
above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. 
Id. at 499. 
 3 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 16 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).  The benefit principle reflects the view “[t]hat 
fairness in taxation requires that taxpayers contribute in proportion to the benefit 
they derive from government.”  Id.   Murphy and Nagel think that this view should be 
rejected along with other pre-distributive concepts of fairness including horizontal 
and vertical justice.  “The benefit principle, however, cannot be saved from incoher-
ence . . . . It is inconsistent with every significant theory of social and economic 
justice.”  Id. at 19.  See also Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and Collect Taxes”: The Constitu-
tional Case For Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 123 (1999) (“Benefit 
theory is divided into two arguments, ‘property benefits’ and ‘income-equals-
benefit.’”).  Although he predates Murphy and Nagel, Professor Martinez’s discus-
sion of these two ways of looking at benefit theory help explain the distributive 
justice concerns raised by Murphy and Nagel.  According to Professor Martinez, 
“[t]he ‘property benefits’ argument suggests that, although personal benefits are 
roughly uniform, the amount of property benefits rises with the amount of property 
owned. . . . The ‘income-equals-benefit’ argument suggests that personal income is 
the measure of the ‘personal well-being’ that the government protects.”  Id. 
 4 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 13 (“Everyone agrees that taxation should 
treat taxpayers equitably, but they don’t agree on what counts as equitable treatment.  
It is standard practice in addressing the question to distinguish between vertical and 
horizontal equity.  According to this conception, vertical equity is what fairness de-
mands in the tax treatment of people at different levels of income . . . ,and 
horizontal equity is what fairness demands in the treatment of people at the same 
levels.”). 
 5 See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND 
POLICY 120–27 (3d ed. 2004). 
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me.  Rather, differently situated people should be taxed differently.  This 
maxim is known as vertical equity.6
These two norms, horizontal and vertical equity, stated as one 
principle with two important divisions, have long been used to evalu-
ate the fairness of tax legislation.7  Most published work on tax 
fairness has focused on these two norms and the four views of tax jus-
tice in the political (legislative) context rather than the judicial.8  My 
concern is that the tax structure of horizontal and vertical equity, 
within which the principles mentioned above and others may com-
pete for acceptance, ought to be reflected in the United States 
Supreme Court’s tax decisions. 
My thesis is that the Court uses systemic, but not substantive, tax 
fairness norms to classify taxpayers as similarly situated to each other 
and the government.  Further, a trend is developing in the Court’s 
Commerce Clause and tax fairness jurisprudence: the Court has be-
come more willing to consider distributive justice principles in the 
context of vertical tax equity.  My research shows that the Court has 
refined horizontal equity into what I call systemic and substantive 
branches.  Furthermore, the Court’s use of vertical equity suggests a 
starting point for future application of distributive justice principles 
in Supreme Court tax fairness jurisprudence. 
I have organized this Article by focusing on three areas in which 
the Court has used tax fairness norms in resolving tax disputes: tax 
administration, statutory construction, and state taxation tested 
against the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses of the United 
States Constitution.  In reviewing the materials,9 I found that the 
 6 Id. at 122. 
 7 Martinez, supra note 3, at 116 (“[C]rafting a system of taxation that results in a 
fair distribution has proven to be a daunting task.  In their attempt to achieve a fair 
distribution of the tax burden, tax policy-makers rely on two crude principles: hori-
zontal equity and vertical equity.”). 
 8 See Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001) (characterizing “eq-
uity in taxation [as] being a political rather than a jural concept”). 
 9 To determine the scope, extent, and manner of use of tax fairness norms, I 
searched for decisions of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court em-
ployed fairness principles in resolving tax controversies.  The process I used was a 
simple word search in a commercial Supreme Court database.  I looked for cases in 
which the term “tax” was linked to terms such as “fairness” or “equity.”  I then se-
lected those cases that I thought best represented the Court’s jurisprudence in 
applying tax fairness norms.  Finally, I compared the Court’s use of tax fairness 
norms to generally accepted legislative tax fairness analysis.  In this way I hoped to 
determine whether the principles used to guide legislation can be seen reflected in 
the final outcomes of tax controversies at the Supreme Court level. 
Some decisions in which the Court used the word “fairness” in connection with a 
tax dispute were rejected and not included in my analysis.  This exclusion of cases 
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Court employs both vertical and horizontal equity norms as well as 
subordinate equity principles such as the benefit principle and the 
ability to pay principle in resolving tax disputes.  I start by explaining 
the tax fairness norms observed in the cases reviewed.  I then show 
how the least controversial norm, horizontal equity, was developed 
early by the Court and expanded over time.  I next show that the 
Court divided horizontal equity into two branches.  One branch, sys-
temic horizontal equity, evaluates similarity without resort to content.  
In other words, the Court does not consider ability to pay measured 
by income, wealth, or consumption when using this branch of hori-
zontal equity.  Instead, analysis under systemic horizontal equity is 
concerned primarily with consistency and, to a lesser degree, regular-
ity and certainty of application.  The second branch of horizontal 
equity, substantive horizontal equity, uses ability to pay as the primary 
criterion for grouping similarly situated taxpayers.  The evolution of 
vertical tax equity and the related points of the benefit principle and 
the ability to pay principle are also addressed in this Article. 
II. TAX FAIRNESS NORMS 
The literature on tax fairness discusses two structural methods 
for analyzing the fairness of federal income tax questions: equity 
measured along vertical and horizontal axes.  Equity measured hori-
zontally and vertically can be succinctly stated as requiring that 
similarly situated taxpayers must be treated alike and that differently 
situated taxpayers must be treated in ways that reflect their differ-
ences. 
There is very little debate about whether horizontal equity 
should be considered a tax policy norm.10  The principle that simi-
larly situated taxpayers should be treated similarly is neither new nor 
controversial.  As is so often true in matters of tax, however, the diffi-
occurred primarily because the Court did not explain what it meant by the fairness 
terms it used or because the explanation, or implicit but unstated fairness claim, was 
better or more completely developed in other decisions.  From the group of cases 
that remained I uncovered other cases in which the Court did not use the term “fair-
ness,” but did use equity norms in resolving the tax issues presented in the case.  
Pursuant to this approach I was left with a group of cases that addressed tax fairness 
issues in three contexts: tax administration, statutory construction, and state taxation 
tested against the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.  
These three subgroups are linked by the Court’s application of tax fairness princi-
ples. 
 10 Richard A. Musgrave, Equity and the Case for Progressive Taxation, in TAX JUSTICE: 
THE ONGOING DEBATE 9, 9 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002) 
(“The principle of horizontal equity—that people in equal positions should be 
treated equally—is hardly debatable.”). 
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culty arises in the application of the norm rather than in its defini-
tion.  The primary concern centers on the criteria that should be 
used to determine whether taxpayers are similarly situated.  No two 
taxpayers are exactly alike.  Consider for example two wage-earners 
working side-by-side for exactly the same compensation.  Leaving 
aside personal issues such as marital status or number of dependants 
and focusing exclusively on work-related issues, the taxpayers may still 
have significant differences that prevent them from being treated ex-
actly alike.  One might incur deductible employment-related 
expenses such as uniform laundering fees or continuing professional 
education that the other does not.11  The question may then become 
one of materiality.12  In other words, are the similarities strong 
enough in some relevant way to overcome any differences that exist 
between the taxpayers? 
One of the components of horizontal equity is an analysis of the 
commonalities between taxpayers.  This analysis leads to identifying 
whether these commonalities are material and sufficiently similar to 
warrant similar treatment.  Material and sufficient similarity would 
both be required.  Taxpayers who are alike in material ways may 
nonetheless have differences in scale that overpower the initial find-
ing of similarity.  The taxpayers in the above illustration may be alike 
in that they both incur employment-related business expenses associ-
ated with continued professional education for their identical 
professional positions.  If Taxpayer A elects to take her professional 
classes from a school that charges her $1,000, while Taxpayer B takes 
the same classes from a school that charges $10,000, we may need to 
refine our criteria for similarly situated taxpayers.  We may find, for 
example, that the difference in price reflects an education-related 
item such as class size, a tangentially related item such as computer 
study aids, or additional unrelated expenses such as the provision of 
meals.  Presented with these possibilities, we would have to decide 
whether Taxpayers A and B should be treated similarly.  In other 
words, we would have to determine whether both would be able to 
deduct the full cost of their tuition.  This, in turn, might depend on 
whether the differences in cost were due to material factors, such as 
 11 Employment-related expenses of this type are known as employee business ex-
penses and are deductible under I.R.C. § 162 (2000) subject to the limitations of 
I.R.C. § 67 (2000).  See also I.R.C. § 62(a)(2) (2000) (reimbursed employee business 
expenses). 
 12 See DODGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 122 (“Once it is acknowledged that not every 
person is like-situated, it is necessary to come up with a ‘difference principle,’ a way 
of telling whether people are alike or different, and, if different, by what degree dif-
ferent . . . .”). 
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class size or information technology, or immaterial factors such as lav-
ishly catered meals. 
It may be that there is only one axis for horizontal equity and the 
distinctions I raise are merely slicing the materiality component into 
increasingly slimmer sections.  It may be, however, that materiality is 
the first cut and further refinements are on a different axis.  Material-
ity may refer to whether the taxpayer is in a class of taxpayers entitled 
to a particular treatment, such as those who incur employee business 
expenses.  The magnitude of the benefit or burden imposed on that 
class, however, may be a separate question that no longer requires 
consideration of whether the taxpayer is entitled to be treated simi-
larly to other taxpayers, but rather the extent to which the taxpayer 
benefits or pays within the class of similarly identified taxpayers. 
My reading of the cases is that the Court adopts the former view 
expressed above.  I believe that the Court would see the first two dis-
tinctions (class size or computer study aids) raised in the employee 
business expense illustration as further refinements of material dif-
ferences rather than separate questions measured along another axis.  
The difference in education expense due to educational costs is likely 
to be seen as immaterial whereas the difference in expense due to 
costs unrelated to education is likely to be seen as material.  These 
material differences distinguish taxpayers who are entitled to deduct 
amounts paid for education and those who are prohibited from de-
ducting amounts paid that are not for education.  Accordingly, 
expenses for meals that were folded into distinctions based upon 
educational costs would not be permitted under horizontal equity 
analysis. 
The foregoing paints the standard picture of horizontal equity.  I 
would like to further refine the concept by dividing this standard ap-
proach into what I will call substantive horizontal equity and systemic 
horizontal equity.  The Court views these two components as distinct 
and often applies one while declining to apply the other.  In the 
above described illustration, I believe that the Court would not use 
ability to pay in determining which taxpayers are similarly situated.  
Rather, the Court would analyze the tax fairness of allowing one tax-
payer a deduction for education expenses while denying the same 
deduction to another by examining consistency, regularity, or cer-
tainty of application, and not by examining the taxpayers’ ability to 
pay, consumption, or wealth.  In other words, the Court would ask 
whether any of the taxpayers incurred expenses within a consistently 
defined boundary called educational expenses.  So long as the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue was consistent in applying a 
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reasonable definition of educational expenses, the Court would up-
hold the Commissioner’s definition even if taxpayers with identical 
income, wealth, or consumption were treated differently.  This, in my 
view, is an application of systemic horizontal equity. 
Historically, commentators have studied the fairness of any tax 
burden in any tax system (income, estate, sales) by first determining 
whether it falls equally on taxpayers of similar income, wealth, or 
consumption.13  If, for example, one wanted to know whether a ten 
percent tax on the sale of alcohol would be fair, one would want to 
know whether taxpayers who consume equal amounts of alcohol were 
taxed equally.  Fairness requires equally situated taxpayers to be 
taxed equally.  The main issue is identifying what should be consid-
ered in determining which taxpayers are equally situated.  If 
consumption of alcohol is the measure of equality, then the tax 
would be fair because every taxpayer would pay a ten percent tax on 
every dollar used to purchase alcohol.  If, however, the measuring 
tool is income, then the tax burden will be born more heavily by 
those who use a high percentage of their income to purchase alcohol, 
even if the actual amounts of alcohol consumed are identical.14  This 
form of tax equity analysis, termed substantive horizontal equity, 
evaluates the substantive economic status of taxpayers as measured by 
consumption, income, or wealth, and is different from another form 
of horizontal equity analysis that does not evaluate the economic 
status of taxpayers.  This second form of horizontal equity analysis, 
termed systemic horizontal equity, does not evaluate the economic 
status of taxpayers, but instead evaluates the consistency, certainty, 
and regularity of application of the law. 
Substantive horizontal equity asks about all of the above de-
scribed issues in the context of comparing various taxpayers’ ability to 
 13 See John A. Miller, Rationalizing Injustice: The Supreme Court and the Property Tax, 
22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 126 (1993) (“Depending on the form of tax in question, the 
possible indices of equality may be income, consumption or wealth.”). 
 14 If the tax on alcohol is five percent, and Taxpayer A with $60,000 of annual 
income consumes $600 worth of alcohol in one year, she will pay $30 in tax—0.05% 
of her income.  If Taxpayer B with $120,000 of annual income also consumes $600 of 
alcohol, she will pay the same $30 in tax, but it will be a smaller burden when com-
pared to her annual income—only 0.025%.  Accordingly, if the two are compared on 
the basis of consumption, they are similarly situated and similarly treated, and thus, 
the tax would be viewed as fair.  If percent of income is the measure of fairness, then 
the tax can be criticized as unfair since Taxpayer A carries twice the burden of Tax-
payer B, despite the fact that they both consumed $600 worth of alcohol.  Thus, 
similarly situated taxpayers are being taxed differently as to the percent of their in-
come.  See ALAN GUNN & LARRY WARD, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL 
TAXATION 10 (West 5th ed. 2002). 
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pay in the forms of income, wealth, and consumption.15  Systemic 
horizontal equity is related to substantive horizontal equity in that 
both look for similarly situated parties, but systemic horizontal equity 
does not ask any questions about economic status as measured by 
consumption, wealth, or ability to pay.  Instead, systemic horizontal 
equity is more concerned with whether taxpayers, and the govern-
ment, receive consistent, regular, and certain treatment under the 
law.16  Through a series of decisions, the Court has come to endorse 
systemic horizontal equity as a tool for interpreting tax laws.  In two 
related cases concerning state property tax, the Court declined the 
opportunity to employ substantive horizontal equity in interpreting 
state tax laws.17
A great deal of the energy of modern tax fairness thinking has 
been directed at analyzing whether vertical equity is a valid compo-
nent of tax fairness.  Vertical equity is essentially identified with the 
taxation of incomes at different rates with the higher rates reserved 
for higher incomes.18  The leading treatise on this point is The Uneasy 
Case for Progressive Taxation by Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr.19  
The central question addressed is: “On what grounds is a progressive 
tax on income to be preferred to a proportionate tax on income?”20  
Blum and Kalven defend progressive taxation based upon the princi-
ple of equality of sacrifice of taxpayers as measured by a theory of the 
marginal utility of money.21  In the authors’ words, “Assuming a dol-
lar is worth less to the man with the larger income than to the man 
with the smaller income, a dollar taken from the former will involve 
 15 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 641 (1975) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).  This case concerned a corporate taxpayer who was assessed accumulated 
earnings taxes under I.R.C. § 531.  Id. at 620–21 (majority opinion).  The Court 
found that the taxpayer must value readily marketable securities at their market value 
rather than cost basis in determining whether the taxpayer is liable for accumulated 
earnings tax.  Id. at 629.  Justice Powell in dissent characterized the holding as fol-
lows: “In short, the Court construes the statute to mean that although unrealized 
appreciation is not included in computing earnings and profits, it is includable in 
determining whether earnings and profits have been accumulated unreasonably.”  
Id. at 639 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Justice Powell goes on to recommend that the 
Court adopt principles of sound accounting practice that “have the virtues of consis-
tency, regularity and certainty—virtues that also assure fairness and reasonable 
predictability in the Commissioner’s administration of this penalty tax.”  Id. at 641. 
 17 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Nord-
linger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 18 Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 759 (1995). 
 19 WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION (4th impression, Univ. of Chicago Press 1963). 
 20 Id. at 3. 
 21 Id. at 49–51. 
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less sacrifice than one taken from the latter.”22  But some, including 
Blum and Kalven, question whether the marginal utility of income 
falls with rising income and whether different individuals will derive 
equal utility from similar incomes.23
This criticism can be illustrated by considering two groups of in-
dividuals.  One group might be comprised of a set of entrepreneurs 
who greatly value every dollar they earn as a sort of tally in a game 
played with other similarly inclined entrepreneurs; perhaps Donald 
Trump might be emblematic of this group.  Consider next a group of 
spiritually fulfilled individuals with no interest in earthly units of 
money; perhaps the late Mother Theresa might represent this group.  
To the entrepreneurs, the utility of money might rise with rising in-
comes as they overtake other players in their pursuit of recognition 
for their economic prowess.  Similarly, the utility of money for the 
spiritual person might remain constant, above subsistence levels, and 
therefore also not be supportive of a model of declining utility of 
money. 
From these two groups we might infer that marginal utility of 
money may not decline with increasing income and that there is no 
agreement on equality of utility of money between the groups and 
thus between individuals.  Blum and Kalven concede that there is un-
certainty in the calculus of utility, but they claim: 
 However uncertain other aspects of progression may be, there is 
one thing about it that is certain.  A progressive tax on income 
necessarily operates to lessen the inequalities in the distribution 
of that income.  In fact, as we noted at the outset, progression 
cannot be defined meaningfully without reference to its redis-
tributive effect on wealth or income.  It would seem therefore that 
any consideration of progression must at some time confront the 
issue of equality.24
Current scholarship infused the debate about vertical equity with 
theories of distributive justice.25  While the cases I reviewed do not 
explicitly address distributive justice claims, they do lay the ground-
 22 Id. at 51. 
 23 Id. at 53 (“The assumption is that the utility of the last dollar taken in taxes is 
independent of the total dollars the taxpayer had before taxes.  It may be true that to 
take $2 from a man with $5,002 and to take none from a man with $5,000 entails less 
total sacrifice than taking $1 from each; but surely it is highly debatable that this is 
true if in the example the richer man had an income of $10,000, had grown accus-
tomed to this standard of living, and for the first time $4,998 in taxes had just been 
taken from him.”). 
 24 Id. at 70. 
 25 See Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What 
Rawls Demands From Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004). 
WOOD 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  10:04:26 AM 
430 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:421 
 
work for beginning the discussion.  The Court has developed a body 
of work that describes governmental benefits that may be considered 
in evaluating whether a taxpayer is paying his or her fair share of the 
costs of those benefits.  That is a starting point for evaluating whether 
there has been a distribution of wealth through benefits and taxation. 
Blum and Kalven might have predicted that the Supreme Court 
would need to address notions of connectivity between benefits and 
taxes because they understood taxes not to be “one-sided trans-
fer[s].”26  No one disagrees that to some extent taxpayers can be seen 
to purchase benefits with the taxes they pay.27  The question becomes 
the degree of congruity between taxes paid and value received.  This 
is another way of asking what counts as a benefit.  One method for 
evaluating benefits and their relationship to taxes is to attempt to 
quantify the value of government services received by taxpayers.  An-
other method would be to use income or wealth as a proxy for that 
value.28  The Supreme Court, in several cases addressing state taxa-
tion of out-of-state taxpayers, began the difficult task of connecting 
governmental services to taxes paid by those who benefit from the 
services.29
III. SYSTEMIC OR ADMINISTRATIVE FAIRNESS 
One of the first applications of fairness principles to tax ques-
tions arose in procedural due process claims, brought by taxpayers, 
that focused on tax statutes of limitations.  One case concerned the 
retroactivity of tax legislation in which the Court raised fairness con-
cerns sua sponte.30  In the other case, the Court let stand lower court 
decisions concerning the fairness of unequal treatment of a taxpayer, 
who filed a fraudulent return followed by a non-fraudulent return, 
and claimed to be similarly situated with taxpayers who file non-
fraudulently without previously filing fraudulently.31  In each case, the 
Court takes up fairness questions in the context of statutes of limita-
tions and provides illustrations and applications of discrete principles 
of fairness. 
 26 BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 19, at 35. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 35–39; see also Martinez, supra note 3, at 123 (“The ‘income-equals-
benefit’ argument suggests that personal income is the measure of the ‘personal well-
being’ that the government protects.”). 
 29 See infra Section VI. 
 30 Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co. (Electric Storage Battery IV), 329 U.S. 
296 (1946). 
 31 Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386 (1984). 
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A. Statute of Limitations and Horizontal Equity 
Tax statutes of limitations were at issue in both Rothensies v. Elec-
tric Storage Battery Co.32 and Badaracco v. Commissioner.33  In Electric 
Storage Battery, the taxpayer paid federal excise taxes on the sale of 
electric storage batteries from 1919 to 1926 and properly deducted 
the amount paid in excise taxes from its income in determining its 
income tax liability.34  The taxpayer brought suit for refund of the ex-
cise taxes.35  In 1935, the government repaid the taxpayer over one 
million dollars in settlement of a judgment of the United States Dis-
trict Court with respect to the excise taxes.36  The period from 1919 
to 1922 was not part of the judgment or the settlement because it was 
barred by the statute of limitations from the action in the district 
court.  The Collector of Internal Revenue, Mr. Rothensies, treated 
the settlement received by the taxpayer in 1935 as income for that 
year.37  The taxpayer claimed that based upon a theory of recoup-
ment the taxpayer should be allowed to reduce the amount of 
income tax owed by the amount of excise tax it overpaid for the years 
1919 to 1922.38  In other words, the taxpayer wanted credit for taxes 
incorrectly paid but which were non-refundable due to the passage of 
time and the application of the statute of limitations. 
 32 329 U.S. 296 (1946). 
 33 464 U.S. 386 (1984). 
 34 In the first of a series of cases, Electric Storage Battery Co. v. McCaughn (Electric 
Storage Battery I), 52 F.2d 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1931), the taxpayer successfully sued for 
the recovery of excise taxes paid on batteries manufactured by the taxpayer.  The dis-
trict court awarded the taxpayer $973,532.57 plus interest, totaling $1,362,861.27.  Id.  
The taxpayer then settled his claim with the IRS for $825,151.52 plus interest, for a 
total of $1,395,515.35.  Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Rothensies (Electric Storage Bat-
tery II), 57 F. Supp. 731, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1944); see also, Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at 
298.  The taxpayer then sued to recover income taxes paid in 1935 based upon a 
claim for recoupment of excise taxes paid from 1919 to 1922, which the district court 
granted.  Electric Storage Battery II, 57 F. Supp. at 732.  The Third Circuit agreed, Elec-
tric Storage Battery Co. v. Rothensies (Electric Storage Battery III), 152 F.2d 521, 526 
(3d Cir. 1945), but the Supreme Court reversed.  Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 
303. 
 35 Electric Storage Battery II, 57 F. Supp. at 731. 
 36 Electric Storage Battery III, 152 F.2d at 522.  The taxpayer was awarded a refund 
of $973,532.57 in excise tax overpayment, plus interest.  In Electric Storage Battery I, the 
taxpayer settled the claim for a refund of $825,151.52 in excise tax, plus interest.  52 
F.2d at 210. 
 37 Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 298.  The District Court, the Court of Ap-
peals, and the Supreme Court agreed that the amount was income in the year 
received by the taxpayer.  Id.   
 38 Id. 
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The taxpayer’s claim was based upon the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Bull v. United States,39 which held that taxpayers may assert a 
claim for recoupment against a government claim for unpaid taxes 
when the taxpayer’s claim “aris[es] out of some feature of the trans-
action upon which the [government’s] action is grounded.”40  
Contrary to the government’s view, the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit applied the doctrine by defining “transactions” to in-
clude those arising out of a single line of business that extended over 
different tax years.  The court held: 
The doctrine of recoupment is based on concepts of fairness.  We 
see no reason, therefore, for hedging the “transaction” part of the 
requirement within close quarters, especially where, as here, there 
is a logical connection between main claim and recoupment 
claim.  As to the fairness of the matter, we agree with the District 
Court where his opinion stated: “Every consideration of fair deal-
ing demands that the taxpayer be credited as against its present 
liability with the taxes which it has been illegally compelled to pay, 
and I think that the decisions of the courts fully justify such a so-
lution.”41
The Supreme Court agreed that the taxpayer’s position was 
grounded on valid fairness principles, but nevertheless, ruled against 
the taxpayer: 
 It probably would be all but intolerable, at least Congress has 
regarded it as ill-advised, to have an income tax system under 
which there never would come a day of final settlement and which 
required both the taxpayer and the Government to stand ready 
forever and a day to produce vouchers, prove events, establish 
values and recall details of all that goes into an income tax con-
test.  Hence a statute of limitation is an almost indispensable 
element of fairness as well as of practical administration of an in-
come tax policy. 
 . . . . 
 As statutes of limitation are applied in the field of taxation, the 
taxpayer sometimes gets advantages and at other times the Gov-
ernment gets them.  Both hardships to the taxpayers and losses to 
the revenues may be pointed out.  They tempt the equity-minded 
judge to seek for ways of relief in individual cases.42
 39 295 U.S. 247 (1935). 
 40 Id. at 262. 
 41 Electric Storage Battery III, 152 F.2d at 524 (quoting Electric Storage Battery II, 57 F. 
Supp. at 735). 
 42 Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 301–02. 
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The Court of Appeals characterized the taxpayer’s recoupment claim 
as required by “consideration[s] of fair dealing.”43  The government 
claimed, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed, that a statute of 
repose is an “almost indispensable element of fairness” in the admini-
stration of income tax.44  The Court did not specifically say why the 
government’s fairness claim was found to be superior to the tax-
payer’s fairness claim, but the Court’s analysis suggests some 
possibilities. 
First, the Court articulated a fairness principle unique to statutes 
of limitations.  The Court explained the nature of statutes of repose 
as being grounded in fairness: 
Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in 
their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by pre-
venting surprises through the revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have 
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.  The theory is that even if 
one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice 
to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be 
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to 
prosecute them.45
Then, the Court elevated the fairness attributes of the statute of limi-
tations over those of the taxpayer’s recoupment claim based on the 
system-wide increase in fairness achieved by the statute compared to 
the individual fairness that might have been achieved by recoup-
ment.46  The Court indicated that the recoupment claim would have 
required an examination of the taxpayer’s books and records for 
many years before the claim was brought.47  This was so, the Court 
explained, because while the one issue of overpaid excise taxes cut in 
favor of the taxpayer, there may have been other unexamined issues 
in the earlier years that might cut in the government’s favor.48  Al-
though both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that 
the taxpayer’s claim should, in the interest of fairness, be allowed to 
offset the current tax liability because taxes were mistakenly paid in 
 43 Electric Storage Battery III, 152 F.2d at 524 (quoting Electric Storage Battery II, 57 F. 
Supp. at 735). 
 44 Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 301. 
 45 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. 
Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)). 
 46 See id. at 302 n.3.  The Court’s decision might also be explained by appeals to 
efficiency or caseload management.  However, the Court employs fairness language 
in its analysis and I will take it at its word.  Id. 
 47 See id. at 302. 
 48 See id. at 302 n.3. 
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prior years,49 the Supreme Court declined to create a rule that would 
allow recoupment claims of undetermined certainty to prevail over 
the fairness claims certain to effect the entire tax system.50  Accord-
ingly, the individual fairness claim was subordinated to a systemic 
fairness claim of the statute of limitations. 
This analysis suggests that while the Court was sympathetic to the 
taxpayer’s fairness claim, it viewed the claim as incomplete because it 
did not take into account the scope of inquiry into past years’ transac-
tions that would be necessary to judge the claim’s fairness.51  
Additionally, the Court indicated, the claim failed to take into ac-
count a larger systemic fairness that is inherent in all statute of 
limitations problems; namely, that administration of claims without 
finality would be unworkable.52  As a result, the Court decided to ana-
lyze the taxpayer’s claim on the basis of fairness principles including 
horizontal equity. 
Applying horizontal equity, the Court observed that the tax-
payer’s recoupment claim could work in both directions.53  It would 
be possible for both taxpayers and the tax collector to circumvent the 
statute of limitations and make valid claims for a refund.54  However, 
in McEachern v. Rose,55 the Court ruled against allowing the tax collec-
tor to make a claim for reduction of a taxpayer’s overpayment refund 
after the statute of limitations on an earlier unpaid tax had run.56  In 
that case, the Court found that the government could not reduce the 
taxpayer’s otherwise valid refund based on claims for taxes that the 
government failed to assess years earlier and that were now barred 
from collection by the statute of limitations.57  Accordingly, in order 
to allow the taxpayer’s claim in Electric Storage Battery, the Court would 
 49 Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 299. 
 50 See id. at 302. 
 51 The Court stated: 
Every assessment of deficiency and each claim for refund would invite a 
search of the taxpayer’s entire tax history for items to recoup.  This 
case provides evidence of the extent to which this would go.  When this 
suit was brought in 1943, the claim pleaded as a recoupment was for 
taxes collected over twenty years before and for over sixteen years 
barred by the statute. 
Id. 
 52 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 53 Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 302 n.3. 
 54 See id. 
 55 302 U.S. 56 (1937). 
 56 Id. at 62. 
 57 Id. at 60. 
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have had to reverse McEachern or face another serious fairness issue in 
allowing recoupment by taxpayers, but not by the government. 
Horizontal equity is usually stated as a requirement that similarly 
situated taxpayers should receive similar, if not identical, treatment 
on issues that are materially indistinguishable.  Electric Storage Battery 
varied the traditional understanding of this principal in two ways.  
First, the government, rather than the taxpayer, raised the claim and, 
second, the similarly situated parties were the government and the 
taxpayer rather than the taxpayer and another taxpayer.  However, 
neither the fact that the government raises the claim, nor the substi-
tution of the government for another taxpayer, diminishes or 
otherwise alters the force of the claim or changes the basic principles 
on which horizontal equity claims are based. 
The commonality between the taxpayer and the government in 
Electric Storage Battery is the application of the statute of limitations.  
For good and sufficient reasons58 the Court, in McEachern, found that 
the government could not employ recoupment to resurrect time-
barred claims to offset timely claims for refund made by the tax-
payer.59  It reasoned that to allow the taxpayer to employ recoupment 
and to prohibit its use by the government would implicitly violate 
horizontal equity.60  Similarly, the taxpayer in Electric Storage Battery 
failed because the principles of horizontal equity, consistency, regu-
larity, and certainty prevented the taxpayer’s use of recoupment 
where the government was also constrained in that way.61  Horizontal 
equity is based upon the application of the law in ways that promote 
uniformity of treatment among parties.  Therefore, reasons for treat-
ing one party in a particular way should be just as valid when applied 
to another party if the facts that are material to such treatment are 
the same. 
 58 Although the decision in McEachern was primarily an exercise in statutory  
construction, the Court applied a systemic horizontal equity analysis, noting “[t]he 
similar treatment accorded by the statutes to credit against an overdue tax, and to 
payment of it; the prohibition of credit of an overpayment of one year against  
a barred deficiency for another; and the requirement that payment of a barred  
deficiency shall be refunded, are controlling evidences of the congressional  
purpose . . . .”  McEachern, 302 U.S. at 62. 
 59 Id. 
 60 The Court characterized its holdings in Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937), and 
McEachern as “[e]quitable considerations not within the reach of the statutes . . . .”  
McEachern, 302 U.S. at 62.  In my view, the equitable consideration referred to by the 
Court, though not explicitly explained, is systemic horizontal equity. 
 61 “As statutes of limitations are applied in the field of taxation, the taxpayer 
sometimes gets advantages and at other times the Government gets them.”  Rothen-
sies v. Electric Storage Battery (Electric Storage Battery IV), 329 U.S. 296, 302 (1946). 
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These cases add to our understanding of the application of hori-
zontal equity in two ways.  First, the basic tax policy of horizontal 
equity can now be seen as acting more broadly, encompassing not 
only similarly situated taxpayers, but also the government and tax-
payers if they are similarly situated.62  Second, when applying 
horizontal equity principles the Court finds systemic horizontal 
claims to be more persuasive than individual fairness claims, which, if 
upheld would violate horizontal equity principals.63
Application of horizontal equity requires courts to determine 
which parties are similarly situated and the degree of their similarity.  
In Electric Storage Battery, the Court held that the government, as well 
as another taxpayer, could be considered a party for the purpose of 
horizontal equity analysis.64  With respect to degree of similarity, in 
Badaracco v. Commissioner,65 discussed below, the Court held that a 
taxpayer who files a fraudulent return and one who fraudulently 
failed to file a return in the first place are distinct for the purpose of 
horizontal equity analysis and, thus, may be subject to disparate 
treatment.66
In Badaracco, the taxpayers complained of disparate treatment 
they received when compared to other taxpayers that they identified 
as similarly situated.67  Here, the taxpayers, Ernest Badaracco, Sr. and 
Ernest Badaracco, Jr., conceded that they filed fraudulent partner-
ship and individual tax returns for calendar years 1965 through 
1969.68  On August 17, 1971, the taxpayers filed non-fraudulent 
amended returns for those years and paid additional tax as required 
by the amended returns.69  The amended returns were filed after fed-
eral grand juries in New Jersey subpoenaed books and records of the 
partnership, but before the taxpayers were indicted for filing false 
and fraudulent returns.70  The taxpayers pleaded guilty to the charge 
with respect to tax year 1967’s returns and the remaining counts were 
 62 “Whether or not the statute, §§ 608 and 609 of the Revenue Act of 1928, be 
taken to compel the conclusion we reach in this case, the court’s recognition that 
both parties to taxation are affected impartially, though perhaps harshly, by policy of 
repose has application here.”  Id. at 302 n.3. 
 63 Id. at 301. 
 64 See id. at 302 n.3. 
 65 464 U.S. 386 (1984). 
 66 Id. at 401. 
 67 Id. at 400. 
 68 Id. at 389. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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dismissed.71  On November 21, 1977, six years and three months after 
the filing of non-fraudulent amended returns, the Commissioner 
mailed notices of deficiency to the taxpayers for each of the tax years 
1965 through 1969.72
The Commissioner in Badaracco argued that § 6501(c)(1) of the 
Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter “Code”) denied any period of 
limitations in the case of “a false or fraudulent return with the intent 
to evade tax.”73  Among other arguments, the taxpayers asserted that 
it would be “unfair ‘to forever suspend a Sword of Damocles over a 
taxpayer who at one time may have filed a fraudulent return, but who 
has subsequently recanted and filed an amended return providing 
the Government with all the information necessary to properly assess 
the tax.’”74  The taxpayers claimed that reading § 6501(c) literally, as 
the Commissioner and the courts below had read it, “produces a dis-
parity in treatment between a taxpayer who in the first instance files a 
fraudulent return and one who fraudulently fails to file any return at 
all.”75  If a taxpayer who has fradulently failed to file a return for a 
particular year later files a non-fraudulent return for that tax year, 
under I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) that filing will trigger the running of the 
normal three-year statute of limitations.  The Badaraccos claimed that 
they were similar to such a taxpayer and should therefore get similar 
treatment even though they had filed an earlier fraudulent return.76  
In practice, this would have meant that the filing of the non-
fraudulent second return would have triggered the running of the 
statute of limitations and the government would have been time-
barred from assessing any additional deficiencies against the taxpay-
ers.  Under § 6501(c)(1), however, the Court denied that result to 
the Badaraccos.77  Despite recognizing that the Badaraccos had filed 
non-fraudulent second returns, the Court declined to treat them as it 
would treat fradulent non-filers. 
The Court found, however, that Congress intended different 
limitation results in the two circumstances described by the taxpay-
ers.78  It arrived at this conclusion using standard statutory 
construction techniques and added that if its interpretation were 
 71 Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 389. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 392 (quoting I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1) (2000)). 
 74 Id. at 400 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 26, Deleet Merch. Corp. v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 386 (1984) (No. 82-1509)). 
 75 Id. at 400. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 395–96. 
 78 Id. at 401. 
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wrong then Congress should use clearer language.79  The Court also 
took up the fairness claim itself and examined its merits.  The Court 
rejected the taxpayers’ fairness claim, stating that “a taxpayer who has 
filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax hardly is in a posi-
tion to complain of the fairness of a rule that facilitates the 
Commissioner’s collection of the tax due.”80  Its fairness analysis re-
lied upon estoppel and systemic horizontal fairness.  The estoppel 
notion reflected in the Court’s statement that the taxpayers were not 
in a position to complain of fairness is not unique to tax and is not 
apposite to this Article.  The second fairness analysis, systemic hori-
zontal fairness, is consistent with tax fairness theory and will be 
discussed below. 
The taxpayers in Badaracco alleged that their second, non-
fraudulent, return provided the Commissioner with all of the infor-
mation that the Commissioner needed to properly assess the 
taxpayers liability.81  If true, then the taxpayers’ claim was merely for 
equal treatment with other taxpayers who had provided the same 
level of information and for treatment different from those who 
fraudulently file and never recant.82  The Badaraccos appealed to the 
second principal of tax fairness83 that emerged from Electric Storage 
Battery, similar treatment for taxpayers who are systemically similarly 
situated, and its corollary, different treatment for differently situated 
taxpayers.84
The Court rejected the Badaraccos’ claim by denying that they 
were similar to other taxpayers who had not first filed fraudulent re-
turns.85  The Court articulated significant administrative difficulties 
that followed when a taxpayer first filed a fraudulent return and then 
filed an amended non-fraudulent return.86  These difficulties in-
cluded the untrustworthiness of a second return from a fraudulent 
source (since the new return comes after the taxpayer has already 
made false statements under penalty of perjury), the likelihood that 
underlying books and records may also have been falsified, and the 
administrative timing problems of coordinating a criminal fraud case 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 400. 
 81 Id. at 398. 
 82 Id. at 400. 
 83 The first principal being that the government, as well as the taxpayer, could 
bring a horizontal equity claim.  Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery (Electric Storage 
Battery IV), 329 U.S. 296, 302 (1946). 
 84 See id. at 301–03; see also discussion supra text accompanying notes 32–63. 
 85 Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 400. 
 86 Id. at 398. 
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with a six year statute of limitations and a civil fraud case with any-
thing less than the same period of limitations.87
For the same reasons listed above, the Court also rejected the 
Badaraccos claim that they were not materially different from taxpay-
ers who fraudulently failed to file any return and later filed a non-
fraudulent return.88  In such a case, the non-fraudulent return would 
start the running of the statute whereas the subsequent filing of a 
non-fraudulent return by the Badaraccos would not.89  While the 
Court conceded that from the taxpayers’ point of view the similarities 
between a fraudulent filer and a fraudulent non-filer were significant, 
the differences, discussed above, when viewed from the Commissioner’s 
perspective, were greater.90
The Court viewed the similarities offered by the Badaraccos as 
material.91  However, the Court viewed the differences offered by the 
Commissioner as equally material and more persuasive in that they 
spoke to a fairer system rather than to fairness in a single applica-
tion.92  In a way, the Court was reaffirming the first principal of 
horizontal equity, articulated in Electric Storage Battery, that the gov-
ernment was entitled to be viewed as equal to any other party to a tax 
fairness claim.93  Here, the government successfully argued that tax-
payers who file fraudulent returns present very different 
 87 Id. at 398–99. 
 88 Id. at 401. 
 89 The Court stated: 
     The [Badaraccos’] argument centers in § 6501(c)(3), which pro-
vides that in a case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed ‘at 
any time.’  It is settled that this section ceases to apply once a return 
has been filed for a particular year, regardless of whether that return is 
filed late and even though the failure to file a timely return in the first 
instance was due to fraud.   
Id. 
 90 “Thus, although there may be some initial superficial plausibility to this argu-
ment on the part of petitioners, we conclude that the argument cannot prevail.”  Id. 
 91 Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 401. 
 92 The Court implied this when it stated that “it seems to us that a taxpayer who 
has filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax hardly is in a position to com-
plain of the fairness of a rule that facilitates the Commissioner’s collection of the tax 
due.”  Id. at 400. 
 93 In his dissent, Justice Stevens cites Electric Storage Battery for the proposition that 
“‘a statute of limitation is an almost indispensable element of fairness as well as of 
practical administration of an income tax policy.’”  Id. at 405–06 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery (Electric Storage Battery IV), 329 
U.S. 296, 301 (1946).  As I have argued, the fairness principle of Electric Storage Battery 
is that the government and the taxpayer are equally situated in that they both have 
an equal stake in the outcome, and that systemic fairness (consistency, regularity, 
and certainty) is the standard of practical administration referred to by the Court in 
Electric Storage Battery. 
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administrative problems from taxpayers who do not file at all, even if 
the reason for non-filing is fraud.94  Accordingly, the Badaraccos did 
not state a claim for similar treatment because they could not estab-
lish that they were sufficiently similar to the taxpayers they referenced 
to warrant similar treatment.95
Although both decisions accept the government as a party to a 
horizontal equity analysis,96 Badaracco took Electric Storage Battery to the 
next logical step.  Badaracco pushed the analysis of horizontal equity 
further by examining the nature of claims of similar situation be-
tween parties,97 and looking for material similarities and differences.  
When both are found, the Court weighs the fairness claims.  In Bada-
racco, the Court viewed the Commissioner’s systemic fairness claim to 
be more persuasive than the taxpayers’ claim of individual unfair-
ness.98  The Commissioner’s claim had the virtue of consistency 
(because of the similarities between taxpayers that the Commissioner 
treated similarly), regularity (because the Commissioner routinely 
applied the same rule to all taxpayers), and certainty (because it was a 
bright line test from which there was no deviation).99  Accordingly, 
although unrelated to ability to pay, the Court’s analysis was nonethe-
less horizontal because it looked for material similarities and 
differences in grouping taxpayers.  The point of similarity was sys-
temic rather than substantive because it was about application within 
the system, not about the Code’s content. 
In these two cases, the Court adopted horizontal equity princi-
ples in applying systemic tax rules, even though it did not articulate 
an explicit horizontal equity standard.  This is the start of what this 
 94 Id. at 398–99 (majority opinion). 
 95 Id. at 401. 
 96 In Electric Storage Battery, the Court stated that “[a]s statutes of limitation are 
applied in the field of taxation, the taxpayer sometimes gets advantages and at other 
times the Government gets them.  Both hardships to the taxpayers and losses to the 
revenues may be pointed out.”  329 U.S. at 302.  In Badaracco, the Court is not so ex-
plicit in stating its goal for the equal application of tax fairness to the taxpayer and 
government, but the Court’s holding implicitly makes the same point.  464 U.S. at 
386. 
 97 Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 398–401. 
 98 Trustworthiness and reconciliation of civil and criminal fraud administration 
were cited by the Court in favor of the government.  Id. at 398–99.  Both of those rea-
sons are within what I have called systemic horizontal equity because they concern 
tax administration regularity.  These reasons concern the efficient process of evaluat-
ing the tens of thousands of tax returns that the government must examine.  If the 
Court agreed with the taxpayers’ claim that their similarity to other taxpayers was a 
higher value than the systemic horizontal equity value of regularity, then the efficient 
and fair treatment of all taxpayers would have been diminished. 
 99 See id. at 398–99. 
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Article calls “systemic horizontal equity.”  It is systemic rather than 
substantive because it does not employ substantive horizontal equity 
concerns such as ability to pay, wealth, or consumption.  Instead, the 
Court applies systemic horizontal equity principles of consistency, 
regularity, and certainty.  The distinction is important because sys-
temic horizontal equity is content-neutral whereas substantive 
horizontal equity is content-based. 
B. Development of Systemic Horizontal Equity Beyond Statute of 
Limitations Cases 
Although the Supreme Court may not always use the word fair-
ness in addressing tax questions, fundamental fairness principles are 
sometimes implicitly used in analyzing the statutes.  Moreover, tax-
payers in some cases have claimed that the treatment they received 
from the Service was unfair.  Accordingly, even though the Court 
does not explicitly use fairness in its analysis, it may do so by implica-
tion in ruling on taxpayers’ claims of unfair treatment. 
The Commissioner publishes rulings and takes litigation posi-
tions consistent with his or her understanding of the law at the time.  
As this understanding evolves, the Commissioner may change posi-
tions previously announced.  Taxpayers have argued that these 
changes in position can be unfair to taxpayers in one of two ways.  
First, taxpayers have argued that unfairness might result if a taxpayer 
relies in good faith upon a position taken by the Commissioner and 
structures a transaction or takes other measures consistent with the 
Commissioner’s position only to find a later change in position, with-
out a change in the law.  Second, an unfairness claim has been 
asserted when one taxpayer received favorable tax treatment under a 
ruling of the Commissioner and a second identically situated tax-
payer received a different and less favorable treatment by the 
Commissioner after a change in position, even when there has been 
no change in the law.  The Supreme Court recognizes neither of 
these circumstances as unfair to the taxpayer. 
In Dickman v. Commissioner,100 the taxpayers made substantial in-
terest-free loans to their son.101  The issue before the Court was 
whether the foregone interest was a gift within the meaning of  
§ 2501(a)(1) of the Code, subjecting the taxpayer to gift tax liabil-
ity.102  After determining that the foregone interest was a gift under 
 100 465 U.S. 330 (1984). 
 101 Id. at 331–32. 
 102 See id. at 331. 
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the Code, the Court turned to the taxpayers’ claim that their reliance 
upon previous positions announced by the Commissioner insulated 
them against liability under the Commissioner’s new interpretation 
of the Code.103  The Court rejected the claim, specifically noting that 
the Commissioner may “change an earlier interpretation of the law, 
even if such a change is made retroactive in effect.”104  Moreover, the 
Court indicated, “[t]his rule applies even though a taxpayer may have 
relied to his detriment upon the Commissioner’s prior position.”105
Although the taxpayers’ claim of unfairness was expressly based 
upon detrimental reliance, it was also implicitly based upon a com-
parison of their treatment by the Commissioner against that afforded 
to taxpayers who reported identically structured transactions prior to 
the Commissioner’s change of view as to the correct interpretation of 
the law.  By denying the taxpayers’ unfairness claim, the Court de-
nied a systemic horizontal equity claim, as well.  Thus, the case stands 
for the proposition that, while the systemic horizontal equity norms 
of consistency, regularity, and certainty may help in resolving tax dis-
putes, they must defer to the superior administrative norm of 
continuing statutory interpretation and the necessary disparate 
treatment that may ensue. 
In Dickman, the Court held that a horizontal tax equity claim 
that compares taxpayers in identical circumstances who were af-
forded disparate treatment due to shifting interpretations of the law 
will not succeed.106  If the rule were otherwise, of course, the Commis-
sioner could never change his or her mind and seek enforcement of 
a change of opinion about the law.  The Court rightly seems to have 
viewed the taxpayers’ fairness claim as seeking to elevate horizontal 
equity over the Commissioner’s good faith reinterpretations of the 
Code, which due to the passage of time, works different results on 
similarly situated taxpayers. 
Interestingly, this principle works in only one direction.  Sup-
pose that the Court had found that the taxpayers’ interpretation of  
 103 See id. at 342–43 (“Finally, petitioners urge that the Commissioner should not 
be allowed to assert the gift taxability of interest-free demand loans because such a 
position represents a departure from prior Internal Revenue Service practice.  This 
contention rests on the fact that, prior to 1966, the Commissioner had not construed 
the gift tax statutes and regulations to authorize the levying of a gift tax on the value 
of the use of money or property.  From this they argue that it is manifestly unfair to 
permit the Commissioner to impose the gift tax on the transactions challenged 
here.” (citing Crown v. Comm’r, 585 F.2d 234, 241 (7th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. 
United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966))). 
 104 Id. at 343. 
 105 Id. (citing Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965)). 
 106 See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
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§ 2501(a)(1) correct.  Further, suppose that the Commissioner’s ear-
lier interpretation had been the opposite, so that earlier the 
Commissioner had thought the foregone interest was a gift but then 
reversed his opinion and viewed it as outside the scope of  
§ 2501(a)(1).  Now taxpayers who were adversely affected by the prior 
ruling would be able to seek review of their returns and the Commis-
sioner would accede to his new position.  In this way, horizontal 
equity would be available when the Commissioner changes his mind 
in ways that favor the taxpayer.107  In other words, the Commissioner 
would extend the latter treatment, now viewed to be statutorily cor-
rect, to earlier taxpayers, identically situated, who had previously not 
received the same treatment as taxpayers who were later in time. 
In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner,108 the taxpayer re-
ceived favorable rulings in 1934 and 1938, which exempted the 
taxpayer from federal income taxes.109  Those rulings were retroac-
tively revoked in 1945 and the Commissioner sought tax liability for 
tax years 1943 and 1944.110  The Court found that the “Commis-
sioner’s earlier rulings were grounded upon an erroneous 
interpretation of the term ‘club’ in § 101(9) and thus were based 
upon a mistake of law.”111  The Court continued by noting the specific 
grant of authority in the Commissioner to apply any “ruling, regula-
tion, or Treasury Decision” retroactively.112
Although the taxpayer’s position in Automobile Club was similar to 
that advanced by the taxpayer in Dickman, it was somewhat stronger 
because, in Automobile Club, the taxpayer who received the favorable 
treatment under prior Commissioners’ interpretations of the law was 
the same taxpayer who was now bringing the claim.113  Nevertheless, 
the Court rejected the taxpayer’s claim for the same reasons given in 
Dickman.114  From these two cases, it is clear that the Court will not 
 107 This would not be true, however, for taxpayers who are time-barred by the stat-
ute of limitations. 
 108 353 U.S. 180 (1957). 
 109 See id. at 181. 
 110 See id. 
 111 Id. at 183. 
 112 Id. at 184 (“‘The Secretary, or the Commissioner with the approval of the Sec-
retary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling, regulation, or Treasury 
Decision, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive 
effect.’”) (quoting I.R.C. § 3791(b) (1939)). 
 113 “The Commissioner had determined in 1934 that the petitioner was a ‘club’ 
entitled to exemption under provisions of the internal revenue laws . . . . The Com-
missioner revoked these rulings in 1945 . . . .”  Id. at 182. 
 114 “[I]t is well established that the Commissioner may change an earlier interpre-
tation of the law, even if such a change is made retroactive in effect.”  Dickman v. 
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consider disparate taxpayer treatment, based upon changed ruling 
positions, as a violation of the principles of systemic horizontal equity. 
One may instead analogize administrative changes of position to 
legislative modification.  Taxpayers divided by legislation that affects 
their tax liabilities may only be viewed as similar if the events at issue 
arose prior to or after the relevant legislation.115  Similarly, while the 
taxpayers in Automobile Club and Dickman drew comparisons with 
other taxpayers positioned on the other side of the administrative 
change, the Court viewed taxpayers as falling into similar groups only 
if they fell on the same side of the change.116  Thus, systemic horizon-
tal equity allows for administrative change in the same way it allows 
for legislative change.  Taxpayers may make systemic horizontal eq-
uity claims, but the group within which they may find similarities 
must account for the change.117
Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 343 (1984).  “[I]t is clear from the language of the section 
and its legislative history that Congress thereby confirmed the authority of the Com-
missioner to correct any ruling, regulation or treasury decision retroactively, but 
empowered him, in his discretion, to limit retroactive application to the extent nec-
essary to avoid inequitable results.”  Automobile Club of Mich., 353 U.S. at 184. 
 115 Most legislation is prospective in that the statute applies to “conduct, events, 
and circumstances which occur after its enactment.”  2 NORMAN J. SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.01 (5th ed. Clark Boardman Callaghan 
1993).  Tax legislation is more complex in that “[t]ax legislation may be retroactive if 
the legislature clearly so intends.”  Id. § 41.10. 
 116 “We thus find no basis for disagreeing with the conclusion, reached by both 
the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals, that the Commissioner, having dealt with 
petitioner upon the same basis as other automobile clubs, did not abuse his discre-
tion.”  Automobile Club of Mich., 353 U.S. at 186. 
 117 No discussion of horizontal equity in the administration of the Internal Reve-
nue Code would be complete without some mention of IBM v. United States, 343 F.2d 
914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).  In that case, the Court of Claims allowed the taxpayer to prevail 
on a horizontal equity claim in which IBM sought a favorable private letter ruling on 
a matter materially identical to one on which its only competitor had obtained a fa-
vorable letter ruling.  The Claims Court allowed IBM the same treatment afforded its 
competitor, even though the Commissioner had changed his mind on the law in the 
interim.  Courts have subsequently limited the application of IBM to cases in which 
the taxpayers are the only two competitors in the field, both have sought guidance 
that only one has received, and where that guidance was initially favorable, but sub-
sequently shown to be incorrect.  See, e.g., Peerless Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 
922, 929 (8th Cir. 1999).  It is, of course, not clear how the Supreme Court would 
have decided IBM, given its view that systemic horizontal equity does not require that 
taxpayers receive identical treatment when separated by a change in the Commis-
sioner’s opinion about the law.  Therefore, it seems likely the Supreme Court would 
not have ruled as the Claims Court did.  However, because this Article’s scope is con-
fined to Supreme Court jurisprudence of tax fairness, I will not address the issues 
raised in IBM. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF FAIRNESS IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
When interpreting individual Code provisions, the Supreme 
Court has embraced a notion of fairness that reflects horizontal eq-
uity.  The Court has construed statutory provisions in ways that result 
in “consistency, regularity, and certainty.”118  In other words, the 
Court follows the principle of systemic horizontal equity.  The Court 
employed substantive horizontal equity where the distinctions created 
by Congress were meant to further horizontal equity based upon abil-
ity to pay, wealth, or consumption. 
United States v. Correll119 concerned a taxpayer who, in the pursuit 
of his wholesale grocery business, left home early in the morning, ate 
breakfast and lunch on the road, and returned home in time for din-
ner.120  He sought to deduct the cost of his breakfast and lunch as 
business expenses under § 162(a)(2) of the Code.  Section 162(a)(2) 
provides that traveling expenses, including meals, may be deducted if 
they are incurred “while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or 
business.”121  The Commissioner interpreted that provision to exclude 
expenses incurred on travel that required neither sleep nor rest.122  
The Court analyzed § 162(a)(2) by weighing the fairness of the 
Commissioner’s interpretation against that of the taxpayer. 
The analysis begins not only with § 162, which authorizes de-
ductibility of business expenses, but also with § 262,123 which denies 
deductibility of personal expenses.  It begins here because of an ap-
parent horizontal equity problem posed by the deductibility of meal 
expenses to one class of taxpayers as opposed to the non-deductibility 
of the same expenses by other classes of taxpayers.  In other words, 
taxpayers who do not travel for business reasons, and who have no 
other business connection to their meals, may not deduct the cost of 
their meals, whereas taxpayers who can show a business connection 
to their meals may be able to deduct their expenses.  This seeming 
inconsistency is the result of the intersection of two tax principles.  
One principal, expressed in § 262, prohibits the deductibility of per-
sonal expenses and the other, expressed in § 162, allows the 
deduction of business expenses including those that would otherwise 
be viewed as personal if imbued with sufficient business content.124  
 118 Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 641 (1975). 
 119 389 U.S. 299 (1967). 
 120 See id. at 303. 
 121 I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (2000). 
 122 Correll, 389 U.S. at 302. 
 123 I.R.C. § 262 (2000). 
 124 Correll, 389 U.S. at 300. 
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The Court said that the fact that the Code specifically allows the cost 
of meals to be deducted by some taxpayers while denying deductions 
to other taxpayers who spend money for meals can be viewed as a 
“windfall” for business travelers.125
Congress artlessly divided meals into deductible and non-
deductible based upon whether the meals were incurred while “away 
from home.”126  The Court was left with the job of fashioning a rule 
that fairly grouped taxpayers into each category, deductible and 
nondeductible, based upon the thin statutory distinction of being in-
curred away from home in the pursuit of business.  This is a 
horizontal equity problem because the Court must find a test based 
on characteristics that link taxpayers with similarly strong business 
reasons for deducting the meal expense and exclude taxpayers with 
similarly weak business reasons for incurring the meal expense.  This 
is a substantive horizontal equity analysis because the distinction con-
cerns questions about differing consumption rather than the systemic 
horizontal equity questions of consistency, regularity, and certainty. 
The chief reason for deducting meal expenses associated with 
business travel is the duplication of expenses incurred by such a trav-
eler.  Normally, a person can plan his or her business day around the 
personal necessity of meals; breakfast at home, lunch either prepared 
at home or eaten at restaurants by choice; and dinner at home.  The 
businessperson who is traveling away from home generally loses the 
option of home-prepared meals.  The business traveler is therefore 
viewed as incurring the expenses of meal preparation twice, once at 
home in the form of food preparation facilities in the taxpayer’s resi-
dence and again when the businessperson must pay others to prepare 
meals he or she could otherwise prepare at home.127
 125 “[T]he taxpayer who incurs substantial hotel and restaurant expenses because 
of the special demands of business travel receives something of a windfall, for at least 
part of what he spends on meals represents a personal living expense that other tax-
payers must bear without receiving any deduction at all.” Id. at 301–02. 
 126 “There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses 
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business, including 
. . . traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other 
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away 
from home in the pursuit of a trade or business . . . .”  I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (2000). 
 127 “Because § 262 makes ‘personal, living, or family expenses’ nondeductible . . . 
the taxpayer whose business requires no travel cannot ordinarily deduct the cost of 
the lunch he eats away from home.  But the taxpayer who can bring himself within 
the reach of § 162(a)(2) may deduct what he spends on his noontime meal although 
it costs him no more, and relates no more closely to his business, than does the lunch 
consumed by his less mobile counterpart.”  Correll, 389 U.S. at 302 n.7. 
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The Court acknowledged that it should defer to the interpreta-
tion of the statute given by the Commissioner but also struggled to 
find principled methods for grouping business travelers that fairly 
treated similarly situated taxpayers alike and which furthered the dis-
tinctions based upon personal consumption and business expense.128  
In other words, the Court agreed that similarly situated taxpayers 
should be treated alike and then sought to identify those groups con-
sistent with the demands of §§ 162 and 262. 
The taxpayer in Correll argued in favor of a rule that turned on 
either the distance from home or the number of hours spent away 
from home.129  The Commissioner rejected both rules and argued for 
one that denied deductibility to any taxpayer who was not required to 
sleep or rest while away from home.130  None of these rules was re-
quired by the statute, yet one consistent rule was desired. 
The Court viewed application of both standards advanced by the 
taxpayer as inconsistent with the treatment of other taxpayers who 
traveled miles that were greater or fewer than any number that the 
Court might select.131  Understanding that any rule it fashioned 
would be subject to the criticism that it was in some measure arbi-
trary,132 the Court therefore rejected the taxpayer’s claim of similarity 
or difference between taxpayers otherwise similarly situated based 
upon distance or time.  In so doing, it acknowledged that the factors 
advanced by the taxpayer were reasonable ways to group similarly 
situated taxpayers.  Several amicus briefs supported the taxpayer’s 
proposals.133  The Court considered the distance factor and the time 
 128 Id. at 304–05.  The Court stated that “[o]rdinarily, at least, only the taxpayer 
who finds it necessary to stop for sleep or rest incurs significantly higher living ex-
penses as a direct result of his business travel, and Congress might well have thought 
that only taxpayers in that category should be permitted to deduct their living ex-
penses while on the road.”  Id. at 304–05.  In other words, only the taxpayer who 
incurs extra consumption gets to deduct expenses that would not otherwise be de-
ductible because they are personal (e.g., meals). 
 129 Id. at 303–04. 
 130 Id. at 302. 
 131 The Court stated: 
     Any rule in this area must make some rather arbitrary distinctions, 
but at least the sleep or rest rule avoids the obvious inequity of permit-
ting the New Yorker who makes a quick trip to Washington and back, 
missing neither his breakfast nor his dinner at home, to deduct the 
cost of his lunch merely because he covers more miles than the sales-
man who travels locally and must finance all his meals without the help 
of the Federal Treasury.  
Id. at 303–04. 
 132 Correll, 389 U.S. at 303. 
 133 Id. at 304 n.14. 
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factor the taxpayer suggested, however, and found that both would 
exclude taxpayers from the group entitled to deduct meal expenses 
occupied by Mr. Correll without addressing the underlying reason for 
the distinction—duplication of expenses.134  In support of the “sleep 
or rest”135 rule the Court stated: 
By so interpreting the statutory phrase, the Commissioner has 
achieved not only ease and certainty of application but also sub-
stantial fairness, for the sleep or rest rule places all one-day 
travelers on a similar tax footing, rather than discriminating 
against intracity travelers and commuters, who of course cannot 
deduct the cost of the meals they eat on the road.136
The Court viewed distance traveled and time spent traveling as inap-
posite to the reason for distinguishing between similarly situated 
taxpayers in the meal context—closer ties to the business generated 
extra expense, and thus extra consumption.  The Court explained its 
preference for the Commissioner’s view by reasoning that, “only the 
taxpayer who finds it necessary to stop for sleep or rest incurs  
significantly higher living expenses as a direct result of his business 
travel . . . .”137
This finding fits into one of the principled reasons for distin-
guishing between taxpayers who are otherwise similarly situated.  If 
taxpayers incur greater expense than they otherwise would, and they 
do so for business reasons, then the statute may be applied to address 
the expense incurred for those reasons.  Accordingly, the Court in 
Correll adopted a more equitable interpretation by grouping taxpayers 
according to duplicative meal expenses.  The Court’s reasoning in-
corporated a substantive horizontal equity analysis because it 
concerned the taxpayer’s ability to pay tax on income earned from 
the taxpayer’s trade or business.  If duplicative expenses that, al-
though personal in nature, were incurred for a business purpose were 
not deductible, then the taxpayer would be disadvantaged with re-
spect to others with the same income who did not incur the 
duplicative expense.  The Court’s interpretation recognized that dis-
tinction. 
In Correll, the Court looked for a way to group taxpayers that fur-
thered the underlying tax theory that supported the benefit that 
 134 Id. at 305 n.18. 
 135 In order to meet the statutory requirement that the taxpayer is away from 
home in order to deduct the cost of meals incurred as part of business travel, the 
Commissioner’s position is that the taxpayer must “sleep or rest” while on the busi-
ness trip.  Id. at 299. 
 136 Id.  at 303. 
 137 Id. at 304–05. 
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taxpayers sought.138  In that case, the underlying tax theory con-
cerned a redundant expense associated with meals incurred for 
business reasons.139  The distinctions of time and distance offered by 
the taxpayer were viewed as being further from those reasons than 
the distinction offered by the Commissioner.140  Regardless of 
whether one agrees with the Court’s conclusion, the interesting as-
pect of the decision is the effort made to identify the criteria that are 
most congruent with the underlying reason for the distinction.  The 
relevance of the offered criteria is measured by the Court against the 
reason for the statute, hardly a surprising proposition.141  Yet all of the 
criteria offered would advance the goal of distinguishing between 
taxpayers who were more likely to have incurred extra expense due to 
travel and those who were not.  The Commissioner’s criteria had the 
virtues of both a bright line test and flexibility. 
A person traveling by plane might cover more ground than one 
traveling by car in the same time frame.  If that time were just a few 
hours, it is difficult to see how meal expenses greater than normal 
would have been made necessary even though distance traveled 
might in other contexts capture the statutory notion of a duplicative 
expense.  Distance traveled, therefore, seems less relevant than time 
traveled.  However, if time traveled is to be the criteria, how much 
time is necessary to trigger the deduction?  Would a meal expense in-
curred on an eight hour and one minute trip be deductible while 
meal expense incurred on an eight hour trip would not?  The arbi-
trariness of this time distinction would appear to make this option 
less attractive than the rule advanced by the Commissioner in Correll, 
which provided tighter congruence with the statute’s rationale.  If the 
taxpayer sleeps away from home, he or she is necessarily separated 
from the food preparation facilities, which have already been paid 
 138 “Alternatives to the Commissioner’s sleep or rest rule are of course available.  
Improvements might be imagined.  But we do not sit as a committee of revision to 
perfect the administration of the tax laws.”  Correll, 389 U.S. at 306–07. 
 139 “The taxpayer must ordinarily ‘maintain a home for his family at his own ex-
pense even when he is absent on business,’ and if he is required to stop for sleep or 
rest, ‘continuing costs incurred at a permanent place of abode are duplicated.’”  Id. 
at 306 n.18 (citations omitted). 
 140 “And the Commissioner’s rule surely makes more sense than one which would 
allow the respondent . . . to deduct the cost of his breakfast and lunch simply because 
he spends a greater percentage of his time at the wheel than the commuter who eats 
breakfast on his way to work and lunch a block from his office.”  Id. at 304. 
 141 “The language of the statute— ‘meals and lodging … away from home’—is ob-
viously not self-defining.  And to the extent that the words chosen by Congress cut in 
either direction, they tend to support rather than defeat the Commissioner’s posi-
tion . . . .”  Id. 
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for, and must seek local food preparation at a duplicative cost.  This 
means, of course, that Taxpayer A, who travels one thousand miles in 
her business day but never sleeps away from home, will get no deduc-
tion, but Taxpayer B, who travels fewer miles but does sleep away 
from home, will get the deduction.  While not a perfect fit, this dis-
tinction is closer to that contemplated by Congress and more 
material to the question of categorization of the taxpayers into 
groups for purposes of horizontal equity. 
Correll appears to be the only case in which the Court employed 
a content-based substantive horizontal equity analysis.  However, the 
Court in Correll also applied a systemic horizontal equity analysis when 
it required that §§ 162 and 262 be reconciled for both consistency 
and certainty.142  This reconciliation is well within the systemic hori-
zontal equity norm of consistency.  Accordingly, the use of one type 
of horizontal equity analysis does not preclude the other.  It appears 
that the Court believes that Congress intends to incorporate both 
horizontal equity principles in the legislation it passes.143  If that were 
true, the Court would be justified in applying those same principles 
in the interpretative process.  However, substantive questions con-
cerning income, wealth, or consumption levels are seldom 
contemplated by the Court, which usually confines its inquiry to ques-
tions of consistency, regularity, and certainty. 
In applying a substantive horizontal equity analysis, the Court in 
Correll classified taxpayers into similar groups by looking for distinc-
tions that most closely tracked the statute’s underlying principles.144  
The Court rejected distinctions that excluded taxpayers who logically 
 142 “[T]he Commissioner has achieved not only ease and certainty of application 
but also substantial fairness . . . .”  Id. at 303.  Accordingly, the systemic principle of 
certainty and the substantive principle of ability to pay are reconciled in this deci-
sion. 
 143 “Not surprisingly, therefore, Congress did not extend the special benefits of  
§ 162(a)(2) to every conceivable situation involving business travel.”  Id. at 302. 
 144 The Court stated:
     Any rule in this area must make some rather arbitrary distinctions, 
but at least the sleep or rest rule avoids the obvious inequity of permit-
ting the New Yorker who makes a quick trip to Washington and back, 
missing neither his breakfast nor his dinner at home, to deduct the 
cost of his lunch merely because he covers more miles than the sales-
man who travels locally and must finance all his meals without the help 
of the Federal Treasury.  And the Commissioner’s rule surely makes 
more sense than one which would allow the respondent in this case to 
deduct the cost of his breakfast and lunch simply because he spends a 
greater percentage of his time at the wheel than the commuter who 
eats breakfast on his way to work and lunch a block from his office. 
Correll, 389 U.S. at 303–04. 
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should have been within the beneficial category.145  Accordingly, the 
classifications offered by the taxpayers that were over- or under-
inclusive were relevant, but not as congruent as the one offered by 
the Commissioner.146  Materiality, therefore, in the context of hori-
zontal equity, requires that the criterion used to identify similarly 
situated taxpayers be one that most closely advances the underlying 
reason for the statute.147
The lessons of Correll are two.  First, the Court used substantive 
horizontal equity theory in its construction of one Code provision be-
cause it grouped taxpayers according to similarities based on levels of 
consumption and ability to pay the tax on their business earnings.148  
In other words, the Court indirectly tracked ability to pay tax with ex-
tra consumption incurred for business reasons.  This can be 
illustrated by imagining two taxpayers, A and B, with identical taxable 
incomes of $40,000.  Further imagine that Taxpayer B incurs $1,000 
in meal and lodging expenses, that duplicate his personal expenses, 
but which are incurred for business reasons, whereas Taxpayer A 
does not.  If Taxpayer B cannot further reduce his taxable income by 
those expenses, then his taxable income will be artificially high, 
meaning that although his taxable income would be $40,000 it would 
not reflect one of the expenses incurred in earning that income.  
Additionally, he will have fewer after-tax dollars to pay the tax be-
cause of the $1,000 he spent on food and lodging, which are 
therefore no longer available to pay the tax.  Second, when faced with 
competing horizontal equity claims, one factor the Court considered 
was consistency with other sections of the Code.149  In Correll, that 
meant consistency between §§ 162 and 262 of the Code.150  This ver-
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See supra text accompanying note 141. 
 148 The Court stated: 
Rather than requiring ‘every meal-purchasing taxpayer to take pot luck 
in the courts,’ the Commissioner has consistently construed travel 
‘away from home’ to exclude all trips requiring neither sleep nor rest, 
regardless of how many cities a given trip may have touched, how many 
miles it may have covered, or how many hours it may have consumed.  
By so interpreting the statutory phrase, the Commissioner has achieved 
not only ease and certainty of application but also substantial fairness, 
for the sleep or rest rule places all one-day travelers on a similar tax 
footing, rather than discriminating against intracity travelers and 
commuters, who of course cannot deduct the cost of the meals they eat 
on the road [under § 262]. 
Correll, 389 U.S. at 302–03 (citations omitted). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
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sion of horizontal equity falls more neatly within systemic horizontal 
equity analysis.  Correll, therefore, is an example of the Court using 
both substantive and systemic horizontal equity analyses in interpret-
ing the Code.  The next case in this section, Commissioner v. First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A.,151 focuses on the Court’s use of systemic 
horizontal equity analysis. 
In First Security Bank, the Court applied fairness principles to de-
termine whether § 482 of the Code authorized the Commissioner to 
allocate income from an insurance company to a bank where both 
were owned by the same holding company and the bank was prohib-
ited by law from earning the type of income sought to be allocated.  
In First Security Bank, as it did in Correll and Commissioner v. Groetz-
inger,152 the Court used fairness principles to identify similarly situated 
taxpayers and any reasons for distinguishing among them.153  First, 
the Court looked for consistency with other federal laws, in this case 
other federal banking laws.154  This reinforced the view that tax fair-
ness requires equal treatment among taxpayers with equal tax 
attributes.  The Court also injected a more formal notion of fairness 
following the form required by other federal laws. 
Fairness, as used by the Court in First Security Bank, is a systemic 
claim similar to the systemic claim in Correll.  In both cases, the Court 
searched for ways to increase consistency across the taxing system.  In 
Correll, the Court found a way to consistently apply §§ 162 and 262 so 
as to maintain the integrity of both.  In First Security Bank, the Court 
applied the tax statute in a way that resulted in increased consistency 
with other, non-tax legislation. 
In Commissioner v. Groetzinger,155 the Court again interpreted  
§ 162, this time in the context of its requirement that a taxpayer be 
engaged in a “trade or business” before any amounts expended by 
the taxpayer may be deducted for purposes of the alternative mini-
mum tax as it existed at that time.  In 1978, Groetzinger devoted sixty 
to eighty hours per week to gambling.156  Unfortunately, his winnings 
 151 405 U.S. 394 (1972). 
 152 480 U.S. 23 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes 155–158. 
 153 “As stated in the Treasury Regulations, the ‘purpose of section 482 is to place a 
controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer . . . .’”  First Security 
Bank, 405 U.S. at 407. 
 154 “We think that fairness requires the tax to fall on the party that actually re-
ceives the premiums rather than on the party that cannot.”  Id. at 405. 
 155 480 U.S. 23 (1987). 
 156 See Andrew M. Curtis, Commissioner v. Groetzinger—Supreme Court Holds That 
the “Goods or Services” Test Is Not a Prerequisite to “Trade or Business” Status, 22 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 221, 222 (1987). 
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of $70,000 were more than offset by losses of $72,032.  In order to get 
the full benefit of his losses for alternative minimum tax purposes, 
the taxpayer had to have incurred the losses in his trade or business 
as that term was used in § 162(a).  In analyzing the statute, the Court 
considered its own prior decisions and also considered the fairness of 
allowing the taxpayer’s full-time gambling activity to fall within the  
§ 162(a) definition of trade or business. 
 If a taxpayer, as Groetzinger is stipulated to have done in 1978, 
devotes his full-time activity to gambling, and it is his intended 
livelihood source, it would seem that basic concepts of fairness (if 
there be much of that in the income tax law) demand that his ac-
tivity be regarded as a trade or business just as any other readily 
accepted activity, such as being a retail store proprietor or, to 
come closer categorically, as being a casino operator or as being 
an active trader on the exchanges.157
In interpreting § 162, the Court embraced a fairness analysis that 
identifies similarly situated taxpayers and asks whether there is a sys-
temic or substantive principled reason for distinguishing among 
them.  In Groetzinger, there was no other statute demanding consistent 
treatment as there was in Correll.158  There was also no claim by the 
Commissioner that the taxpayer’s horizontal equity claim would re-
sult in a substantially more difficult administrative burden. 
The Commissioner’s claim was not founded on fairness in gen-
eral or on any modern notion of vertical or horizontal equity.  
Rather, the Commissioner argued that the statutory language at issue, 
the definition of “trade or business,” was resolved by Deputy v. Du-
Pont,159 in which Justice Frankfurter opined that one must offer goods 
or services to be in a trade or business.  The Groetzinger Court specifi-
cally rejected this definition as underinclusive.160  The Court thought 
the taxpayer would be within the DuPont test if one viewed it under a 
form of systemic horizontal equity analysis because “it takes two to 
gamble.”161  That analysis is horizontal in that it compares two simi-
 157 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 33. 
 158 Correll, 389 U.S. at 300 (“Because the respondent’s daily trips required neither 
sleep nor rest, the Commissioner disallowed the deductions, ruling that the cost of 
the respondent’s meals was a ‘personal, living’ expense under § 262 rather than a 
travel expense under § 162(a)(2).”). 
 159 308 U.S. 488 (1940). 
 160 “But does it necessarily follow that one who does not satisfy the Frankfurter 
adumbration is not in a trade or business? . . . In any event, while the offering of 
goods and services usually would qualify the activity as a trade or business, this factor, 
it seems to us, is not an absolute prerequisite.”  Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 33–34. 
 161 Id. at 33.  The phrase “it takes two to gamble” actually comes from the tax-
payer’s brief.  Brief for the Respondent at 3, Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (No. 85-1226), 
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larly situated taxpayers—those on opposite sides of a single gambling 
transaction.  It does not, however, concern a comparison between the 
two taxpayers on the grounds of their ability to pay, their wealth, or 
their consumption.  Instead, it concerns the consistency of their 
treatment under the Code. 
The Court found no principled reason to define one side of a 
business transaction to be in a trade or business while not defining 
the other as such, but this alleged imbalance is common.  When I buy 
milk from the grocer it does not mean that I am in the grocery busi-
ness.  To allow the Court to view both sides as similarly situated, there 
must be something more to the analysis than simply being on oppo-
site sides of a single transaction.  In Groetzinger, the additional 
element is the time spent by the taxpayer in the pursuit of gam-
bling.162  Thus, the transaction was common between the parties and 
so was the time spent in the common activity.  Both sides devoted all 
of their professional time to the same activity.  This suggests that in 
measuring consistency for purposes of horizontal equity, magnitude 
is not measured on a separate axis.  It is instead a further component 
of the primary question of similarity. 
Although unstated, the Court implied that taxpayers who occa-
sionally gamble are not within the class of taxpayers whose business is 
gambling under § 161.163  The difference is the magnitude of the 
gambling.  In order to be within the class of taxpayers who may make 
a claim for similar treatment on the basis of their occupying opposite 
sides of the same transaction, as in the milk illustration above, the 
amount of time spent in the claimed pursuit will distinguish between 
those who prevail on the claim and those who will not.  Magnitude is 
therefore not a separate inquiry from classification under horizontal 
equity; it is instead a component of horizontal equity classification. 
Correll, Groetzinger, and First Security Bank, along with the dissent 
in Ivan Allen Co. v. United States,164 establish three principles for ana-
1985 WL 669433.  However, the Court cites it with approval and suggests that even if 
the DuPont test were the only test to be applied, the Court would still rule for the tax-
payer.  Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 33 & n.12 (“It takes a buyer to make a seller and it 
takes an opposing gambler to make a bet.”) (citations omitted). 
 162 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 36.  The Court noted that “[c]onstant and large-scale 
effort on [Groetzinger’s] part was made. . . . This was not a hobby or a passing fancy 
or an occasional bet for amusement.”  Id. 
 163 “[W]e conclude that if one’s gambling activity is pursued full time, in good 
faith, and with regularity, to the production of income for a livelihood, and is not a 
mere a hobby, it is a trade or business within the meaning of the statutes with which 
we are here concerned.”  Id. at 35. 
 164 422 U.S. 617, 641–42 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Whatever may be said for 
the Court’s view of the ‘unreality’ of adhering to the principles of sound accounting 
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lyzing the fairness of statutory construction.  First, statutes will be in-
terpreted according to the horizontal equity principle that similarly 
situated taxpayers should be treated alike.  Second, horizontal equity 
itself has two subsets that I have termed systemic and substantive 
horizontal equity.  The factors used by the Court in the systemic hori-
zontal equity analysis are consistency with other federal law (both tax 
and non-tax), regularity, and certainty.  Congruity with the underly-
ing reasons for the statute, where the underlying reasons include 
consumption or ability to pay, refers to the substantive horizontal eq-
uity analysis.  Third, the Court will view magnitude of similarity as a 
component of defining the class itself rather than as a separate con-
cern. 
V. TAX FAIRNESS AS A COMPONENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL  
EQUAL PROTECTION 
In 1989 and 1992, the Supreme Court handed down two opin-
ions that set forth the Court’s view of tax fairness in the context of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.  In the 
first case, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission,165 the 
Court considered a West Virginia county tax assessor’s practice that 
“valued . . . real property on the basis of its recent purchase price, but 
made only minor modifications in the assessments of land which had 
not been recently sold.”166  The Court held that the resulting gross 
disparities in assessed value of otherwise comparable property vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.167
In the second case, Nordlinger v. Hahn,168 the Court found that 
Article XIIIA of the California Constitution,169 which provided for a 
two percent cap on annual increases in assessed property valuation 
except for newly purchased, constructed, or transferred property, did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
practice, . . . those principles are the best system yet devised for guiding manage-
ment, informing shareholders, and determining tax liability.  They have the not 
inconsiderable virtues of consistency, regularity and certainty—virtues that also as-
sure fairness and reasonable predictability in the Commissioner’s administration of 
this penalty tax.”). 
 165 488 U.S. 336 (1989). 
 166 Id. at 338. 
 167 Id. 
 168 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 169 The California voters added Article XIIIA to the state constitution by a state-
wide ballot initiative known as Proposition 13.  Id. at 3–4.  This 1978 initiative has 
been described as a “property tax revolt.”  Id.  
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ment.170  In those cases, the property could be assessed at its then-
current market value.171  The Court noted, “[o]ver time, this acquisi-
tion-value system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by 
persons owning similar pieces of property.”172  These two cases show 
that the Court viewed violations of systemic horizontal equity, but not 
violations of substantive horizontal equity, as violating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.173
These two cases present the horizontal equity debate in the con-
stitutional context of the Fourteenth Amendment.174  In both cases, 
the taxpayers successfully established that property owners with simi-
lar wealth, as measured by the value of their property, were being 
taxed differently by their taxing jurisdictions.175  In both cases, the 
taxing jurisdiction discriminated against taxpayers based on the 
length of time the taxpayers held the property subject to tax.  In Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal, the Court began by stating: 
That two methods are used to assess property in the same class is, 
without more, of no constitutional moment.  The Equal Protec-
tion Clause “applies only to taxation which in fact bears unequally 
on persons or property of the same class.” . . . In each case, the 
constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a 
rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property 
owners.176
 170 Id. at 10.  Pointing out that “the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the 
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest,” id., the Court held that the 
“[p]etitioner ha[d] not demonstrated that no rational bases lie for either of these 
exemptions.”  Id. at 17.  Despite recognizing the drawbacks of Article XIIIA, the 
Court could not characterize it as “irrational” or “arbitrary”: 
Certainly, California’s grand experiment appears to vest benefits in a 
broad, powerful, and entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court 
of Appeal surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to 
prompt its reconsideration or repeal.  Yet many wise and well-
intentioned laws suffer from the same malady.  Article XIIIA is not pal-
pably arbitrary, and we must decline petitioner’s request to upset the 
will of the people of California. 
Id. at 18 (citation omitted). 
 171 Id. at 5. 
 172 Id. at 6. 
 173 See also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (striking down Ala-
bama statute which imposed substantially lower taxes on domestic insurance 
companies than out-of-state insurance companies). 
 174 See also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003) (uphold-
ing, for the same reasons as those given in Nordlinger, a statute imposing up to a 
thirty-six percent tax on slot machines at racetracks, but only a twenty percent tax on 
slot machines on riverboats). 
 175 See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 366 
(1989); Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 1. 
 176 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, 488 U.S. at 343 (citations omitted). 
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The problem for the Equal Protection Clause and systemic and sub-
stantive horizontal equity is one of classification.  If the taxpayer in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal is similarly situated to his neighboring prop-
erty owners, then both the Equal Protection Clause and horizontal 
tax equity would require equal treatment.  What is needed is a test for 
similarly situated taxpayers.  Of the two tests we have seen, systemic 
and substantive, the Court in both Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal and Nord-
linger gravitated to the former. 
The Court in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal noted that a taxing juris-
diction could decide to tax property held by corporations at a 
different rate than property held by individuals; “[i]f the selection or 
classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some 
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of 
the equal protection of the law.”177  Both the laws and Constitution of 
West Virginia, the state taxing jurisdiction in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, 
provided that all property should be taxed at a uniform rate 
throughout the state according to its market value.178  The taxpayer’s 
property was of the same class as its neighbors and, under state law, 
should have been taxed according to its market value.179  This, in 
turn, meant that there was no state policy that supported the distinc-
tions in tax made by the county tax assessor, and thus, the taxpayer’s 
claim of similarity to other property owners was sustained.  Accord-
ingly, the Court found that the West Virginia law was being applied in 
a way that violated the constitutional principle of equal protection.180  
Once a taxpayer establishes a class of taxpayers to which he belongs, 
disparate treatment is prohibited both by the Equal Protection Clause 
and by the tax principle of systemic horizontal equity. 
In Nordlinger v. Hahn,181 the Court found that property owners 
who were distinguished from other property owners in their state on 
the same basis as those in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal had no claim under 
the Equal Protection Clause.182  Unlike the taxpayer in Allegheny Pitts-
burgh Coal, the taxpayer in Nordlinger v. Hahn lived in a state which 
had expressed a rational basis for distinguishing between taxpayers 
who had recently purchased their property and those who had held 
the property for a long time.183  The Court stated, “[t]he Equal Pro-
 177 Id. at 344. 
 178 Id. at 338. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 343. 
 181 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 182 See id. at 12. 
 183 Id. 
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tection Clause does not forbid classifications.  It simply keeps gov-
ernmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are 
in all relevant respects alike.”184  Because the classification of newly 
purchased property was supported by rational governmental policy, 
the Court found that new property owners were not similarly situated 
to old property owners under the Equal Protection Clause.185  The lo-
cal county taxing authority in West Virginia offered no rational basis 
for differentiating between newer and older owners of property, 
where doing so was not authorized by state statute, thereby violating 
equal protection.186  California had multiple rational bases for its dis-
tinction187 and, thus, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
The method for classifying taxpayers, as a necessary prerequisite 
for equal protection analysis, is the turning point for the concurring 
opinion of Justice Thomas188 and the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Stevens189 in Nordlinger v. Hahn.  Justice Thomas stated that “whether 
properties or persons are similarly situated depended on state law.”190  
Consequently, when the State of West Virginia classified property by 
value and the Webster County West Virginia Assessor used the date of 
purchase instead of value, there was a breakdown in systemic hori-
zontal equity that amounted to a violation of the Equal Protection 
 184 Id. at 10. 
 185 Id. at 12. 
 186 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, 488 U.S. at 338 (“The Webster County tax assessor val-
ued petitioners’ real property on the basis of its recent purchase price, but made 
only minor modifications in the assessments of land which had not been recently 
sold.  This practice resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally 
comparable property, and we hold that it denied petitioners the equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also id. at 344–45 
(“In each case, ‘[i]f the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, 
and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no 
denial of the equal protection of the law.’  But West Virginia has not drawn such a 
distinction. . . . We are not advised of any West Virginia statute or practice which au-
thorizes individual counties of the State to fashion their own substantive assessment 
policies independently of state statute.”) (citations and footnote omitted). 
 187 The court stated: 
     The . . . exemptions at issue here rationally further legitimate pur-
poses.  The people of California reasonably could have concluded that 
older persons in general should not be discouraged from moving to a 
residence more suitable to their changing family size or income.  Simi-
larly, the people of California reasonably could have concluded that 
the interests of family and neighborhood continuity and stability are 
furthered by and warrant an exemption for transfers between parents 
and children. 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17 (1992). 
 188 Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 189 Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 190 Id. at 22 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Clause because West Virginia tax law was not being applied consis-
tently.191  Classification therefore is first evaluated under state law.  If 
the classification into which the taxpayer is placed is rationally based, 
then the remaining issue is whether the taxpayer was treated consis-
tent with state law and similarly to other members of the same class.192  
That is what I have called systemic horizontal equity. 
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Nordlinger, ex-
pressed his view that the majority believed the Webster County 
Assessor acted without rational basis because he acted contrary to 
state law.193  In other words, the classification into which the taxpayer 
was placed was valid under state law, but invalid under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, since it treated the taxpayer differently from other 
members of the taxpayer’s class.  The Court specifically viewed Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal as presenting a systemic problem.194  The issue 
was consistency of category application, not whether there were other 
ways of classifying taxpayers.  Accordingly, the Court’s decision is 
based upon systemic horizontal equity, not substantive horizontal eq-
uity.  Justice Thomas, in Nordlinger, focused on the Court’s failure in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal to declare that West Virginia could categorize 
property owners by date of purchase.195  The problem was that the 
 191 Id. at 20 (“Moreover, the Court stated, the Constitution and laws of West Vir-
ginia ‘provide that all property of the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate 
uniform throughout the State, according to its estimated market value,’ and ‘[t]here 
[was] no suggestion . . . that the State may have adopted a different system in prac-
tice from that specified by statute.” (alteration in original)). 
 192 Id. at 23 (“Allegheny Pittsburgh, then, does not prevent the State of California 
from classifying properties on the basis of their value at acquisition, so long as the 
classification is supported by a rational basis.”). 
 193 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas 
further opined that violating state law did not make the County Assessor’s classifica-
tion irrational or contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. 
 194 See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989) 
(“There is no suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia, or from any other authoritative source, that the State may have adopted a 
different system in practice from that specified by statute; we have held that such a 
system may be valid so long as the implicit policy is applied even-handedly to all simi-
larly situated property within the State.”); see also Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 
247 U.S. 350, 352–53 (1918) (“[I]ntentional systematic undervaluation by state offi-
cials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right 
of one taxed upon the full value of his property.”).  The Court uses the adjective “sys-
tematic” in several places, but I have taken the liberty of substituting the adjective 
“systemic” in my analysis. 
 195 “The Court refused to decide “whether the Webster County assessment 
method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a State, generally ap-
plied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be.”  Nordlinger, 
505 U.S. at 20 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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State used a different category than the County Tax Assessor.196  This 
lack of consistency led to the violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  While there may have been substantive horizontal issues pre-
sented in the case, they were not the basis of the Court’s decision. 
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority of the Court that the 
problem in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal was an application problem, de 
facto rather than de jure, as was the problem in Nordlinger.197  However, 
he parted ways with the majority over whether the California classifi-
cations in Nordlinger were rational.198  Using the same rational basis 
standard articulated by the majority, Justice Stevens found the classi-
fication of property owners based upon the date of acquisition to be 
arbitrary and unreasonable.199  He believed that the State’s 
“neighborhood preservation” reason was not rationally furthered by 
classification based on date of acquisition.200  In support of this view, 
Justice Stevens offered three rationales.  First, he employed horizon-
tal and vertical tax equity analysis.201  Second, Justice Stevens argued 
that the classification swept too broadly and operated too indiscrimi-
nately to rationally further the State’s goal of neighborhood 
preservation.202  Finally, Justice Stevens disagreed with the State’s ar-
gument that existing property owners had a reliance interest in their 
current tax rates.203  This Article focuses on the first of Justice Stevens’ 
points: that the majority of the Court has uncritically accepted the so-
cial policy goals articulated by California and simultaneously ignored 
the tax policy implications of the State’s actions. 
California adopted the classification at issue in Nordlinger 
(known as Article XIIIA) by statewide ballot.204  This classification was 
intended to help alleviate the problem of taxpayers whose property 
values, and resulting taxes, had accelerated beyond their ability to 
pay.205  Many taxpayers purchased their property when land values 
 196 Id. at 19–21. 
 197 Id. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 198 Id. at 36; see infra text accompanying notes 208–210, 218–223. 
 199 Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 200 “In short, although I agree with the Court that ‘neighborhood preservation’ is 
a legitimate state interest, I cannot agree that a tax windfall for all persons who pur-
chased property before 1978 rationally furthers that interest.”  Id. at 37. 
 201 Id.  at 33. 
 202 Id. at 29–30. 
 203 Id. at 35. 
 204 Id. at 1 (majority opinion). 
 205 “As a result [of rising market values], tax levies continued to rise because of 
sharply increasing assessment values.  Some homeowners saw their tax bills double or 
triple during this period, well outpacing any growth in their income and ability to 
pay.”  Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 4. 
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were low, and their incomes had not increased at the same rate as the 
values of their properties, leaving them unable to pay a tax based on 
current property value.206  Taxpayers feared they may have to sell 
their homes or risk forfeiture due to failure to pay the property tax.207
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Nordlinger, claimed that the divi-
sion of property into classes distinguished by date of acquisition was 
arbitrary and should not pass a rational basis test.208
A state-wide, across-the-board tax windfall for all property owners 
and their descendants is no more a “rational” means for protect-
ing this small subgroup [those who cannot afford higher taxes] 
than a blanket tax exemption for all taxpayers named Smith 
would be a rational means to protect a particular taxpayer named 
Smith who demonstrated difficulty paying her tax bill.209
Justice Stevens’ opinion seems to overstate the Constitutional 
problem.  While a classification that undermines a stated goal in all 
respects is presumably irrational, it is much harder to claim that a 
classification that promotes the state’s goal in some respects is none-
theless irrational.  Certainly, a majority of citizens perceived a link 
between classifying property by its date of purchase and property 
owners’ ability to pay tax upon the values so determined; a majority 
of the Court agreed.  Given that the Court viewed itself as applying a 
deferential standard, it would be very difficult to find the California 
property tax in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution.210  However, if we limit Justice Stevens’ point to 
tax fairness, then perhaps it has more force. 
Nordlinger differs from other cases addressed in this Article be-
cause the rule itself (Article XIIIA) contains a classification being 
tested against Constitutional and tax fairness norms.  As we have 
seen, the Court found that Article XIIIA satisfied Constitutional re-
quirements.211  In so finding, the Court also reached implicit 
conclusions about tax fairness norms.  Systemic horizontal equity, as 
we have seen it developed by the Court, does not generally include 
consideration of taxpayers’ ability to pay unless it is expressed in the 
statute itself, as in Correll.  Systemic horizontal equity, as employed by 
the Court, is content-neutral and does not include questions about 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id.  
 208 Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 209 Id. at 36. 
 210 Id. at 11 (majority opinion). 
 211 “Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline petitioner’s re-
quest to upset the will of the people of California.”  Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 18. 
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taxpayer wealth or income.  Substantive horizontal equity, on the 
other hand, adds wealth and income of the taxpayer to the analysis.  
Even though a legislature might find criteria that would identify simi-
larly situated taxpayers from a systemic point of view, it might 
nevertheless treat them differently if other criteria demonstrated that 
the taxpayers possessed different abilities to pay tax.  The majority in 
Nordlinger viewed all California property owners as alike in all but one 
way: “Petitioner’s true complaint is that the State has denied her—a 
new owner—the benefit of the same assessment value that her 
neighbors—older owners—enjoy.”212  The Court has consistently held 
that distinctions that are material to the underlying tax policy are valid 
means of distinguishing similarly from differently situated taxpayers 
for horizontal equity consideration.  In Nordlinger, the Court ex-
plained that if there is a rational basis for creating a statutory 
distinction between taxpayers, the distinction will not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.213  Logi-
cally, this must mean that statutory distinctions that meet the rational 
basis test do not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or hori-
zontal equity, but this is not necessarily so.214  Failure to meet 
horizontal equity norms should have no bearing on the constitution-
ality of the law,215 but the majority implies that horizontal equity is a 
concern: 
 As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does not dis-
criminate with respect to either the tax rate or the annual rate of 
adjustment in assessments.  Newer and older owners alike benefit 
in both the short and long run from the protections of a 1% tax 
rate ceiling and no more than a 2% increase in assessment value 
per year.  New owners and old owners are treated differently with 
respect to one factor only—the basis on which their property is 
initially assessed. 216
The Court did not evaluate Article XIIIA by asking about ability 
to pay, wealth or consumption.  Instead, the Court is concerned with 
 212 Id. at 12. 
 213 “We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational or reasonable con-
siderations of difference or policy that justify denying petitioner the benefits of her 
neighbors’ lower assessments.”  Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 “Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons.  
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.  It simply keeps govern-
mental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant 
respects alike.”  Id. at 10. 
 216 Id. 
WOOD 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  10:04:26 AM 
2006] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF TAX FAIRNESS 463 
 
consistency.217  Consistent treatment of taxpayers in a rationally de-
vised category is all that equal protection and systemic horizontal 
equity require. 
Justice Stevens asserted that over-inclusiveness resulted in a class 
with members whose ability to pay the tax (the putative criterion 
upon which the class was based) differed.218  He claimed that, from 
the perspective of substantive tax fairness, this violated the principle 
of horizontal equity because the class was not horizontal.219  In other 
words, while it is true that perfect congruity is not required for com-
pliance with horizontal equity, the incongruence of the class in 
California was so great as to defeat even a minimal claim of similarity 
within the class, where similarity means ability to pay.220  Although 
some “early purchasers” could not afford to pay higher property 
taxes, such people only comprised a “small subgroup” of the popula-
tion.  While Article XIIIA protected this small subgroup, it merely 
conferred a “tax windfall” on other “early purchasers” who could af-
ford higher property taxes.221  Further, as owners of commercial, 
industrial, vacant, and other non-residential properties were also in-
cluded within the class,222  the connection to ability to pay became 
even more attenuated.  In Justice Stevens’ view, the State’s interest in 
preserving neighborhood character could not be “rationally fur-
thered” by tax benefits for owners of non-residential properties.223
In addressing the under-inclusiveness of the date of purchase 
classification, the Court seemed to dismiss this claim by noting that 
new purchasers were aware that the classification would cause them 
to pay higher property taxes when they purchased their property.224  
While this is true, the question remains whether the new purchaser is 
better able to pay the tax than the taxpayer who purchased in the 
past; knowledge that one will be assessed a higher tax has no correla-
tion with one’s ability to pay it.  Justice Stevens viewed the majority’s 
position as establishing a “medieval” privilege in families of equal re-
 217 The Court in Nordlinger distinguishes Allegheny Pittsburgh because of the incon-
sistency of application in that case.  “[T]he Court found [in Allegheny Pittsburgh] ‘no 
suggestion’ that ‘the state may have adopted a different system in practice from that 
specified by statute.’”  Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 15 (quoting Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal 
Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989)). 
 218 Id. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 219 Id. at 29–31. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 35–36. 
 222 Id. at 36. 
 223 Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 224 Id. at 12–13 (majority opinion). 
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sources who are treated differently solely because of their different 
heritage.225  In other words, as between two families with equal eco-
nomic resources available to pay for government goods and services 
through a property tax, the family whose ancestors had purchased 
the property first would pay the lower tax.  For Justice Stevens, Article 
XIIIA’s classification “offend[ed] a policy of equal tax treatment for 
taxpayers in similar situations . . . .”226
Summarizing Justice Stevens’ view, classifications used to distin-
guish taxpayers should be based upon their ability to pay (substantive 
horizontal equity), rather than on the date they purchased their 
property.  Justice Stevens believed that both tax fairness and the 
Equal Protection Clause require courts to focus on ability to pay in 
analyzing tax statutes and classifications.  Further, the California clas-
sification system did not advance the justifications given by the State 
for the classes it created. 
The majority believed that the classifications furthered Califor-
nia’s legitimate interests and therefore complied with the demands of 
the Equal Protection Clause.227  This disagreement is at the heart of 
any horizontal equity tax fairness debate.  No one argues that simi-
larly situated taxpayers should be treated dissimilarly.  The issue is 
what counts as similar.  The Court has only once used ability to pay in 
its horizontal equity analysis.228  In Correll, the Court allowed ability to 
pay, or more accurately levels of consumption, to be considered in 
interpreting § 162 of the Code.229  Except in Correll, the Court has 
never used ability to pay as an element of horizontal equity.  The 
Court has never decided whether taxpayers are similar or different on 
that basis.  Seemingly, differences based upon ability to pay will not 
be viewed by the Court as valid statutory construction criteria, unless 
the statute itself raises that concern as it did in Correll.230
 225 Id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 12 (majority opinion). 
 228 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 302–04 (1967). 
 229 Id. 
 230 But see Miller, supra note 13, at 126.  Professor Miller argued that the Court in 
Nordlinger violated horizontal equity principles.  His view was that using income, con-
sumption, or wealth as indices of equality, the California law can be shown to violate 
horizontal equity.  Id. at 126–27.  My view is slightly different.  I contend that in the 
context of statutory interpretation, the Court views those criteria as more closely re-
lated to vertical equity, and that horizontal equity, at least as it is viewed by the Court, 
is content-neutral.  Other than Correll, the Court has not employed substantive hori-
zontal equity (income, wealth, or consumption) in statutory interpretation and 
seems to reject it in Nordlinger’s Equal Protection Clause analysis. 
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Justice Thomas stated in Nordlinger that: 
Allegheny Pittsburgh assumed that whether properties or persons 
are similarly situated depended on state law, and not, as peti-
tioner argues, on some neutral criteria such as size or location 
that serve as proxies for market value.  Under that theory, market 
value would be the only rational basis for classifying property.231
In other words, while a taxing jurisdiction might use property 
value as a proxy for ability to pay, it need not.  Moreover, failure to 
use property value as a distinguishing characteristic is not irrational 
and does not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause.232  Fi-
nally, if horizontal equity requires simply that taxpayers be classified 
on a rational basis and that taxpayers in the same class are similar, 
then horizontal equity is also not violated by the classification system 
used by Article XIIIA. 
California citizens wanted a law that would ameliorate some of 
the problems connected with some taxpayers’ abilities to pay their 
property tax.  The Nordlinger majority held that California crafted a 
law that furthered that objective.233  The fact that the law might have 
been better drawn to help more taxpayers does not mean that the 
one adopted was irrational or that it violated systemic horizontal eq-
uity principles.  Instead, the complaint is that California could have 
done a better job of classifying taxpayers on the basis of ability to pay.  
The law could have created categories that more closely tracked abil-
ity to pay, and thus, the California law is best criticized as violating 
substantive horizontal equity principles.  A violation of substantive 
horizontal equity does not transform into a violation of equal protec-
tion or systemic horizontal equity. 
From Nordlinger, I conclude that the Court generally excludes 
substantive horizontal equity principles from its horizontal equity 
analysis.  Comparative wealth, income, and consumption are relevant 
in creating classifications of taxpayers, but once a classification has 
been established, those concerns recede, and the analysis shifts to 
whether the classification criteria are rational and consistently ap-
plied. 
 231 Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 22 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 232 Id. at 12 (majority opinion). 
 233 Id. at 18. 
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VI. THE ROLE OF FAIRNESS IN INTERPRETING TAX ISSUES UNDER THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, commonly 
known as the Commerce Clause, states that Congress shall have the 
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”234  From this, the Court 
developed a concept known as the Dormant Commerce Clause.235  
The Court uses the Dormant Commerce Clause to provide a level 
playing field for interstate commerce, free from undue interference 
from the states.236  This goal is essentially a fairness inquiry.  Restated, 
the Court applies the Dormant Commerce Clause to prevent one 
state from unfairly restricting trade in a way that favors its citizens 
over citizens of another state.  The Court has applied the Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis to situations involving the imposition of 
taxes upon interstate transactions by states.237  In this section of the 
Article, I will examine Supreme Court cases that have spoken to 
Commerce Clause issues in the context of taxation of interstate trans-
actions.  In my view, these cases show that the Court is expanding its 
fairness jurisprudence to include not only horizontal equity but also 
vertical equity norms. 
The Court employs a fairness analysis when addressing two dis-
tinct constitutional questions concerning state taxation of businesses 
engaged in interstate commerce.  First, the Court discusses fairness in 
the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.238  Second, the Court discusses fairness in the context of the 
Commerce Clause.239  Although there are substantial similarities be-
tween the Due Process Clause fairness concerns and those raised by 
the Commerce Clause, the Court pointed out that, “[d]espite the 
similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and 
 234 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 235 “Under what has come to be known as ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause Doctrine, 
certain state measures regulating or taxing interstate commerce are deemed consti-
tutionally prohibited unless Congress has affirmatively authorized the states so to 
regulate or to tax that interstate commerce.”  1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 203 (3d ed. Foundation Press 2000).  The first case to raise this 
point was Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 236 See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). 
 237 See TRIBE, supra note 235, at 203. 
 238 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Due process centrally 
concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity.”). 
 239 Id. at 313 (“The second and third parts of [the Commerce Clause] analysis, 
which require fair apportionment and non-discrimination, prohibit taxes that pass 
an unfair share of the tax burden onto interstate commerce.”). 
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Commerce Clauses are not identical.”240  Due process is concerned 
with notice to the taxpayer.241  Due process requires fair warning that 
the taxpayer is subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the state.242  The 
Commerce Clause is concerned with the structural effects of state 
regulation on the national economy.243  In other words, the Com-
merce Clause requirements reflect tax fairness policy, while 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause fairness is broader and 
addresses process fairness questions rather than tax fairness ques-
tions.  Accordingly, although the Court has used fairness in both its 
Due Process Clause and its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, I will 
confine my inquiry to the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause analy-
sis.244
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,245 the Court synthesized its 
prior jurisprudence on state taxation and the Commerce Clause, and 
articulated a four-part test to be applied in analyzing whether a state 
tax levied on interstate commerce complies with the Commerce 
Clause.  In reviewing its prior decisions, the Court observed that: 
These decisions have considered not the formal language of the 
tax statute but rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax 
against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly ap-
 240 Id. at 312. 
 241 “[T]he ‘substantial nexus’ requirement [under the Commerce Clause] is not, 
like due process’ ‘minimum contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a 
means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 313. 
 242 “Comparable reasoning justifies the imposition of the collection duty on a 
mail-order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of busi-
ness within a State.  Such a corporation clearly has ‘fair warning that [its] activity may 
subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.’” Id. at 308 (alteration in origi-
nal) (citation omitted). 
 243 Id. at 312. 
 244 In his dissent in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, Justice Brennan explained 
that: 
     In order to tax any transaction, the Due Process Clause requires that 
a State show a sufficient “nexus between such a tax and transactions 
within a state for which the tax is an exaction.”  This question . . . is the 
most fundamental precondition on state power to tax.  But the stric-
tures of the Constitution on this power do not stop there.  For in the 
case of a gross receipts tax imposed upon an interstate transaction, 
even though the taxing State can show “some minimum connection,” 
the Commerce Clause requires that “[t]axation measured by gross re-
ceipts from interstate commerce . . . [be] fairly apportioned to the 
commerce carried on within the taxing state.” 
377 U.S. 436, 449–50 (1964) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 245 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
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portioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, 
and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.246
My interest lies in the meaning the Court gives to the third and 
fourth elements of its test, with particular interest in the fourth.  The 
third element, non-discrimination, is a systemic horizontal equity 
claim.247  The fourth element, fair relation to services provided, is ver-
tical in that it asks whether the taxpayer is taxed at levels consistent 
with the services the state provides him.  The fourth element asks 
whether the taxpayer is contributing more, less, or the same than he 
would be required to pay if he were paying the state directly for the 
services provided. 
A. Tax Fairness, Horizontal Equity, and the Commerce Clause 
In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wrote: 
 When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and 
the lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in propor-
tion to their weight or their tunnage, they pay for the 
maintenance of those public works exactly in proportion to the 
wear and tear which they occasion of them.  It seems scarce possi-
ble to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works.248
This ancient problem of how best to allocate the expenses of 
commerce to those who benefit from the services has given rise to the 
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause tax fairness jurisprudence.  
While the Court may start from the principle of proportionality that 
Smith advocates, it eventually expands upon that basis to include lar-
ger questions of distributive justice. 
In Freeman v. Hewit,249 the Supreme Court addressed the question 
of whether the State of Indiana could levy a one percent tax on a 
transaction by an Indiana resident on the New York Stock Exchange.  
The Court found that the tax violated the Commerce Clause.250  The 
third element of the Complete Auto standard requires that the tax not 
discriminate against interstate commerce.251  This is a horizontal eq-
uity analysis since it asks whether there is an identifiable group of 
taxpayers who are similarly situated but differently treated so as to 
 246 Id. at 279 (citations omitted). 
 247 Under the decisions discussed below, a state may not discriminate against for-
eign competitors in favor of in-state businesses.  This is a systemic claim because the 
analysis is based upon consistency rather than ability to pay, wealth, or consumption. 
 248 SMITH, supra note 2, at 475. 
 249 329 U.S. 249 (1946). 
 250 Id. at 257–58. 
 251 Id. at 257. 
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provide one with a marketplace advantage over the other.  In Freeman, 
the Court stated: 
 It has been suggested that such a tax is valid when a similar tax 
is placed on local trade, and a specious appearance of fairness is 
sought to be imparted by the argument that interstate commerce 
should not be favored at the expense of local trade.  So to argue is 
to disregard the life of the Commerce Clause.  Of course a State is 
not required to give active advantage to interstate trade.  But it 
cannot aim to control that trade even though it desires to control 
its own.  It cannot justify what amounts to a levy upon the very 
process of commerce across States lines by pointing to a similar 
hobble on its local trade.252
The Commerce Clause does not require that in-staters be treated 
identically with out-of-staters.253  Accordingly, the Court rejected the 
horizontal equity claim that would allow state impediments to inter-
state commerce if the state similarly impeded intrastate commerce.254
Although the Court rejected the equal impediment horizontal 
equity claims in Freeman, and refused to allow the fact that intrastate 
sales of the type transacted interstate by Freeman would have been 
subject to the same tax, to justify imposition of such a tax the Court 
uses horizontal equity analysis when the claim is reversed.255  For ex-
ample, in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner,256 the Court 
held that a tax levied by Pennsylvania only on foreign-registered 
trucks violated the third element of the Complete Auto standard.257  In 
other words, treating out-of-state taxpayers like in-state taxpayers will 
not insulate the state against a Dormant Commerce Clause claim, but 
treating out-of-state taxpayers worse than in-state taxpayers will trig-
ger such a claim. 
Through its decisions in Complete Auto, Freeman, and Scheiner, the 
Court settled the horizontal component of tax fairness under the 
Commerce Clause.  Under the third element of the Complete Auto 
standard, the state may not discriminate against foreign competitors 
in favor of in-state business.  That principal is reinforced with the 
 252 Id. at 254. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. (“It is true that the existence of a tax on its local commerce detracts from 
the deterrent effect of a tax on interstate commerce to the extent that it removes the 
temptation to sell the goods locally.  But the fact of such a tax, in any event, puts im-
pediments upon the currents of commerce across the State line . . . .”). 
 255 Freeman, 329 U.S. at 255 (“To extract a fair tithe from interstate commerce for 
the local protection afforded to it, a seller State need not impose the kind of tax 
which Indiana here levied.”). 
 256 483 U.S. 266 (1987). 
 257 Id. at 277; see infra notes 245–46 and accompanying text. 
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practical illustration of Pennsylvania’s attempt at taxing foreign truck-
ing companies while exempting domestic trucking companies from 
the same levy.  Scheiner rejects that tax as unfair to interstate com-
merce because it discriminates against foreign, similarly situated 
taxpayers.  The converse, however, is not true.  Under Freeman, a tax 
on similarly situated domestic businesses will not, of itself, permit the 
tax to be extended to foreign business.  Something more is required.  
The Court left open the door for taxes similar to those imposed by 
Indiana in Freeman to be justified if they are imposed to ensure that 
commerce bears its fair share of the cost of local government.258  
Bearing a “fair share” of the tax burden can be seen as a corollary to 
horizontal tax equity, but it is more often viewed as the separate 
norm of vertical equity.259
B. Tax Fairness, Vertical Equity, and the Commerce Clause 
The fairness argument, grounded in the third element of the 
Complete Auto test, was addressed in Freeman.  There, the Court re-
jected the appeal to horizontal equity fairness but agreed with the 
appeal to distributional fairness when it stated: “State taxation falling 
on interstate commerce, on the other hand, can only be justified as 
designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the 
local government whose protection it enjoys.”260  The connection be-
tween taxes paid and services provided is the fairness link the Court 
identifies as the essence of the fairness question posed by the Com-
merce Clause under the fourth element of the Complete Auto test.261
The Court advanced its theory of distributive fairness in Capitol 
Greyhound Lines v. Brice,262 in which passenger bus companies chal-
lenged the imposition of an excise tax by the State of Maryland on 
the value of buses operated in the state.  The Court upheld the tax, 
reasoning that: 
Complete fairness would require that a state tax formula vary with 
every factor affecting appropriate compensation for road use.  
These factors, like those relevant in considering the constitution-
 258 Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253. 
 259 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 260 Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253. 
 261 Id. at 256 (“These illustrative instances show that a seller State has various 
means of obtaining legitimate contribution to the costs of its government, without 
imposing a direct tax on interstate sales.  While these permitted taxes may in an ul-
timate sense, come out of interstate commerce, they are not, as would be a tax on 
gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which for 
more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 262 339 U.S. 542 (1950). 
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ality of other state taxes, are so countless that we must be content 
with “rough approximation rather than precision.”. . . Upon this 
type of reasoning rests our general rule that taxes like that of 
Maryland here are valid unless the amount is shown to be in ex-
cess of fair compensation for the privilege of using state roads.263
The Court in Capitol Greyhound Lines began a journey on the 
road to modern vertical tax fairness.  As the quotation above illus-
trates, the Court wanted to connect the amount each taxpayer paid to 
the governmental services used by that taxpayer.  This is the very 
foundation of vertical equity—the notion that similarly situated tax-
payers should be treated similarly, but that material differences 
should result in material differences in tax.  Similarity means more 
than just the substantive horizontal question of comparative wealth of 
the taxpayer; it must also include the comparative advantage ob-
tained by a taxpayer in exchange for the tax paid.  That calculus 
cannot begin until there is some attempt at determining what bene-
fits can rightfully be associated with a particular taxpayer.  With that 
information, it can be known whether the taxpayer is underpaying or 
overpaying for the services received.  From there, it can be deter-
mined whether the taxpayer is being treated differently from other 
similarly situated taxpayers or differently from other differently situ-
ated taxpayers. 
Substantive horizontal tax equity is foundational to any notion of 
vertical tax equity.  Questions about what constitutes equal levels of 
income, wealth, and consumption, which make up substantive hori-
zontal equity, precede questions about the differences that may 
require different rates of tax under vertical equity.  Under the Com-
merce Clause, the first inquiry for the Court concerns the state’s 
claim for payment for services rendered to out-of-state taxpayers who 
use state facilities such as roads.264  If consumption of state services 
 263 Id. at 546–47 (citations omitted). 
 264 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) announced what 
became known as the Complete Auto Test. 
“‘[I]t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those en-
gaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden 
even though it increases the cost of doing business.’”  These decisions 
have considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather 
its practical effect, and have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause 
challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus 
with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the State. 
Id. (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938))(footnote 
omitted). 
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can be shown, the inquiry under the Capitol Greyhounds Lines test 
shifts to whether the tax is fairly related to the level of services pro-
vided by the state.265
Apportionment, the second element of Complete Auto, looks to 
whether the state is seeking to tax income unrelated to the nexus that 
gives rise to the opportunity to tax in the first place.266  In other 
words, if a bus company earned ten percent of its income from jour-
neys that passed through a given state, the maximum amount of the 
taxpayer’s income that could be subject to the taxing authority of that 
state would be ten percent.267  The fourth element of the Complete 
Auto test, fair relation to services provided, checks against over-
taxation by multiple jurisdictions by limiting tax to amounts con-
nected with the services provided.268
 265 “This Court and others have consistently upheld taxes on interstate carriers to 
compensate a state fairly for the privilege of using its roads or for the cost of adminis-
tering state traffic regulations.”  Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. at 543–44. 
 266 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261–62 (1989). 
[W]e determine whether a tax is fairly apportioned by examining 
whether it is internally and externally consistent. 
     To be internally consistent, a tax must be structured so that if every 
State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would re-
sult.  Thus, the internal consistency test focuses on the text of the 
challenged statute and hypothesizes a situation where other States have 
passed an identical statute. . . . 
     The external consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only 
that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasona-
bly reflects the interstate component of the activity being taxed.  We 
thus examine the in-state business activity which triggers the taxable 
event and the practical or economic effect of the tax on that interstate 
activity. 
Id. 
 267 This is the reason behind the Court’s concern in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995), that a tax on gross income would be im-
permissible because it would tax income unrelated to business in a given state and 
subject the taxpayer to multiple taxation from multiple states on a given amount of 
income. 
 268 For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission, the Court stated: 
     The fair relation prong of Complete Auto requires no detailed ac-
counting of the services provided to the taxpayer on account of the 
activity being taxed, nor, indeed, is a State limited to offsetting the pub-
lic costs created by the taxed activity.  If the event is taxable, the 
proceeds from the tax may ordinarily be used for purposes unrelated 
to the taxable event.  Interstate commerce may thus be made to pay its 
fair share of state expenses and contribute to the cost of providing all 
governmental services, including those services from which it arguably 
receives no direct benefit.  The bus terminal may not catch fire during 
the sale, and no robbery there may be foiled while the buyer is getting 
his ticket, but police and fire protection, along with the usual and usu-
ally forgotten advantages conferred by the State’s maintenance of a 
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The road to vertical tax fairness, on which the court embarked 
in Capitol Greyhound Lines, concerns the appropriate boundaries for 
determining what the taxpayer should pay as “appropriate compensa-
tion for road use.”269  The Court recognized the difficulty in 
enumerating the proper charges that the taxpayer should pay, but 
the Court also recognized the necessity for making such a determina-
tion.  Because of this difficulty, the Court cabined the issue and 
limited the inquiry to charges connected with the use of state roads.270  
Subsequent Court decisions expanded that inquiry to include other 
services from which taxpayers also benefit while within a state. 
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, 
Inc.,271 the Court uncoupled the connection between the taxes paid 
by out-of-state taxpayers from any requirement that those specific 
funds be restricted exclusively to the use for which they were col-
lected.272  This is not to say that the amounts collected by the state 
may exceed the total costs incurred by the state on behalf of the out-
of-state taxpayer; they may not.  Instead, the state may expand the list 
of services beyond those directly connected to the activity of the out-
of-state taxpayer, and the state need not show a direct path from the 
taxpayer to the purchase of specific services.273  Thus, one could view 
all taxes paid as fungible.  There is no direct link between the reim-
bursement by a taxpayer for his share of an expense and the 
direction of funds paid by the taxpayer into an account dedicated to 
that expense.  The root inquiry is fairness, and the connection be-
tween the cost incurred by the state on behalf of the out-of-state 
taxpayer and the amounts paid by that taxpayer is a measure of fair-
ness, not a promise to segregate taxpayer payments. 
civilized society, are justifications enough for the imposition of a tax.  
Complete Auto’s fourth criterion asks only that the measure of the tax be 
reasonably related to the taxpayer’s presence or activities in the State. 
Id. at 199–200 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 269 “Complete fairness would require that a state tax formula vary with every factor 
affecting appropriate compensation for road use.”  Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. 
at 546. 
 270 “These factors, like those relevant in considering the constitutionality of other 
state taxes, are so countless that we must be content with ‘rough approximation 
rather than precision.’ . . . Upon this type of reasoning rests our general rule that 
taxes like that of Maryland here are valid unless the amount is shown to be in excess 
of fair compensation for the privilege of using state roads.”  Id. at 546–47. 
 271 405 U.S. 707 (1972). 
 272 Id. at 720 (“Yet so long as the funds received by local authorities under the stat-
ute are not shown to exceed their airport costs, it is immaterial whether those funds 
are expressly earmarked for airport use.”). 
 273 Id. 
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In Goldberg v. Sweet,274 the Court applied the fourth prong of the 
Complete Auto test (the tax must be fairly related to the taxpayer’s ac-
tivities within the state) by expanding the scope of activities that 
could be considered beyond those directly tied to the taxpayer’s activ-
ity.  The test’s purpose is to ensure that a State’s tax burden is not 
placed upon persons who do not benefit from the services provide by 
the State.  The Court stated: 
 Finally, we reach the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test, 
namely, whether the Illinois tax is fairly related to the presence 
and activities of the taxpayer within the State.  The purpose of this 
test is to ensure that a State’s tax burden is not placed upon per-
sons who do not benefit from services provided by the State. 
 Appellants would severely limit this test by focusing solely on 
those services which Illinois provides to telecommunications 
equipment located within the State.  We cannot accept this view. 
The tax which may be imposed on a particular interstate transac-
tion need not be limited to the cost of the services incurred by the 
State on account of that particular activity.  On the contrary, “in-
terstate commerce may be required to contribute to the cost of 
providing all governmental services, including those services from 
which it arguably receives no direct ‘benefit.’”  The fourth prong 
of the Complete Auto test thus focuses on the wide range of benefits 
provided to the taxpayer, not just the precise activity connected to 
the interstate activity at issue.  Indeed, last Term . . ., we noted 
that a taxpayer’s receipt of police and fire protection, the use of 
public roads and mass transit, and the other advantages of civi-
lized society satisfied the requirement that the tax be fairly related 
to benefits provided by the State to the taxpayer.275
Here, the Court wanted to prevent out-of-staters from getting a 
free ride with respect to the services provided by the State.276  By ex-
panding the class of services that could be considered in determining 
whether the taxpayer was paying his fair share, the Court enhanced 
fairness by preventing taxpayers from receiving services without being 
charged.  The Court also made the analysis of fairness more difficult 
by sweeping in fractions of state services that are more difficult to ac-
curately determine.  It might be possible, for example, to 
approximate the percentage of the cost of highway services provided 
to a taxpayer who uses a highway for a known period of time, but it 
 274 488 U.S. 252 (1989). 
 275 Id. at 266–67 (citations omitted). 
 276 “Indeed, last Term . . . we noted that a taxpayer’s receipt of police and fire pro-
tection, the use of public roads and mass transit, and the other advantages of 
civilized society satisfied the requirement that the tax be fairly related to benefits pro-
vided by the State to the taxpayer.”  Id. at 267. 
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would be much more difficult to determine the appropriate fraction 
of police services for which the out-of-state taxpayer should pay. 
In The Myth of Ownership, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel argue 
for a vision of tax policy that addresses not only ability to pay, meas-
ured in the historical standards of vertical equity, but also by 
including of the full range of benefits and burdens supplied by, or 
made possible by, government.277  Under this approach, if one is 
taxed ten dollars but is then provided with ten dollars worth of social 
security benefit, police protection, farm subsidy, or roads, it is hard to 
see any tax burden at all.  Instead, one sees merely a payment for 
goods, cash, or services.278  It appears that the Supreme Court has 
taken a few steps on this same road by linking Commerce Clause 
fairness to a showing by the State of the goods and services connected 
to the tax imposed upon out-of-state taxpayers. 
In Goldberg v. Sweet, the Court stated that in evaluating fairness it 
is necessary to examine all governmental services received by a tax-
payer.279  Thus, a taxpayer who provides telecommunications services 
within a state must pay not only for the services provided by the State 
which can be tied directly to the taxpayer’s activities, but also the cost 
of all government services provided to all who conduct any business 
within the state.280  The taxpayer must pay the indirect costs of con-
ducting business in a state in addition to the direct costs. 
The distinction between direct and indirect costs does not imply 
that indirect costs are less worthy of being borne by those who trans-
act business within a state.  The Court indicated that indirect costs 
may be considered in the calculation of whether a tax fairly burdens a 
taxpayer under the Commerce Clause.281  Indirect costs are by no 
 277 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 14–15 (“First, theories of vertical equity are 
frequently myopic, in that they attempt to treat justice in taxation as a separate and 
self-contained political issue.  The result is not a partial account of justice in govern-
ment, but rather a false one.  For what counts as justice in taxation cannot be 
determined without considering how government allocates its resources.”). 
 278 This is also an extension of Rawlsian notions of distributive justice.  See Sugin, 
supra note 25; see also Musgrave, supra note 10, at 16. 
 279 Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 267 (“[T]he Tax Act is fairly related to the benefits re-
ceived by Illinois telephone consumers.  The benefits that Illinois provides cannot be 
limited to those exact services provided to the equipment used during each interstate 
telephone call.  Illinois telephone consumers also subscribe to telephone service in 
Illinois, own or rent telephone equipment at an Illinois address, and receive police 
and fire protection as well as the other general services provided by the State of Illi-
nois.”). 
 280 “[I]nterstate commerce may be required to contribute to the cost of providing 
all governmental services, including those services from which it arguably receives no 
direct benefit.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 281 Id. 
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means small or inconsequential.  They may be significantly higher 
than the direct costs of services provided by government, but far less 
obvious or simple to compute.  The method of computation of indi-
rect costs presents the next fairness problem for the Court. 
In Massachusetts v. United States,282 the Court decided whether an 
annual registration tax, imposed on all civil aircraft that fly in the 
United States’ navigable airspace, could be applied to Massachu-
setts.283  Noting one of the “two attributes of the taxing power,” the 
Court stated that “in imposing a tax to support the services a govern-
ment provides to the public at large, a legislature need not consider 
the value of particular benefits to a taxpayer, but may assess the tax 
solely on the basis of taxpayers’ ability to pay.”284
As indicated earlier, Murphy and Nagel view traditional vertical 
tax equity analysis as insular and divorced from serious distributive 
justice analysis.285  However, in Massachusetts v. United States, the Court 
endorsed the use of substantive horizontal equity principles to pro-
tect the integrity of vertical equity norms.286  Implementing this 
approach, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the tax 
fairly reflected the amount of benefit received.287  In the end, the 
Court allowed taxing jurisdictions to charge out-of-state taxpayers for 
their distributive share of every service the state provides, even 
though a precise calculation of that share’s value is not required, be-
cause it found that the tax fairly reflected the benefit received.288  
Although this analysis is a necessary step on the road to vertical equity 
in the distributive justice model, how far the Court may proceed 
down this road remains to be seen. 
 282 435 U.S. 444 (1978). 
 283 See id. at 446. 
 284 Id. at 455 (plurality opinion); see also Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. 
United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974) (“Taxation is a legislative function, and Con-
gress, which is the sole organ for levying taxes, may act arbitrarily and disregard 
benefits bestowed by the Government on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay, 
based on property or income.  A fee, however, is incident to a voluntary act, e.g., a 
request that a public agency permit an applicant to practice law or medicine or con-
struct a house or run a broadcast station.”) 
 285 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, 14–15.  Vertical equity norms require the tax-
ing jurisdiction to lay taxes based upon ability to pay, whereas substantive horizontal 
equity norms require that members of the classes selected by the taxing jurisdiction 
be similarly situated in their ability to pay.  Systemic horizontal equity ensures consis-
tent application of the rule. 
 286 Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. at 468–69. 
 287 See id. 
 288 See id. 
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
The cases covered herein demonstrate that the Court has fol-
lowed two separate lines of jurisprudence in applying tax fairness 
norms.  One line concerns statutory construction and the other ad-
dresses fairness in the Commerce Clause context.  In construing tax 
statutes, the Court has employed two different fairness norms based 
upon legislative horizontal equity principles.  The first norm, systemic 
horizontal equity, is content-neutral and resolves tax fairness ques-
tions on the basis of consistency, regularity, and certainty.  The 
second norm, substantive horizontal equity, which is applied less fre-
quently, is content-specific, and resolves questions of tax fairness 
through inquiry into income, wealth, and consumption.  The second 
line of fairness jurisprudence applies both types of horizontal equity 
and introduces a strain of vertical equity by assessing the degree to 
which taxpayers, subject to the Commerce Clause, pay for the services 
they receive from a given state in exchange for the taxes they pay.  
This is the first step in any analysis that seeks to evaluate whether a 
taxpayer is over- or under-taxed relative to income compared to ser-
vices received because it establishes a baseline amount to determine 
whether a taxpayer is paying more or less than other taxpayers for 
services received.  Accordingly, it invokes legislative questions such as 
redistribution of wealth and progressive income taxation. 
A brief review of the cases covered in this Article shows that in 
both Correll289 and First Security Bank,290 the Court recognized that fair-
ness required consistent treatment among taxpayers.  There, the 
Court looked for consistency with other federal laws (both tax and 
non-tax) and congruency with the legislative purpose.  Consistent 
with systemic horizontal equity, these two factors are used by the 
Court to identify similarly situated taxpayers.  In Correll, the Court 
also examined the statute’s content to determine whether taxpayers 
were similarly situated with respect to their ability to pay.291  This is 
the only time the Court has used substantive horizontal equity to re-
solve questions of fairness in interpreting tax statutes. 
 In Groetzinger, the Court viewed the continuity, regularity, and 
primary purpose of the taxpayer’s gambling as distinguishing him 
from similarly situated taxpayers (those in the category of “taxpayers 
who gamble”) for whom gambling was but “a sporadic activity, a 
 289 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 303 (1967). 
 290 Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394, 407 (1972). 
 291 See Correll, 389 U.S. at 304–06. 
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hobby, or an amusement diversion.”292  The degree to which this tax-
payer filled the category changed the category itself (introducing a 
subcategory of “taxpayers for whom gambling is a ‘trade or busi-
ness’”), so that one who occasionally gambles is not in the “trade or 
business” of being a gambler, but, like the taxpayer in Groetzinger, one 
who earns a living through gambling is.293
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal294 and Nordlinger,295 the Court con-
firmed its interest in applying systemic horizontal equity to the 
exclusion of substantive horizontal equity.  These two cases illustrate 
that the Court will use systematic horizontal equity concerns such as 
consistency, regularity, and certainty to evaluate the fairness of tax 
legislation, rather than substantive horizontal concerns such as ability 
to pay as measured by income, wealth or consumption to determine 
the fairness of tax legislation. 
The Court’s Commerce Clause tax fairness analysis illustrates a 
progression toward current vertical equity analysis.  In Goldberg, the 
Court endorsed distributive fairness by taking into account the bene-
fits a taxpayer received in evaluating the fairness of the tax imposed 
on the taxpayer.296  However, the Court rejected a simpler analysis 
that looked only to cash transfers and income distribution in judging 
the fairness of tax burdens on taxpayers.297  Thus, the Court implied 
that the problem of identifying the goods and services that should 
count, though difficult, are necessary to seriously consider income 
and wealth distributions in American society.298
In these cases and others, the Supreme Court addressed hori-
zontal tax equity in administrative rulings by applying statutes of 
limitations, for example, in ways that ignore the distinction between 
the government and the taxpayer.299  The Court also split horizontal 
equity into its two constituent components, systemic and substantive 
horizontal equity, in these cases.  As the Court indicated, this distinc-
tion turns on the definition of substantive horizontal equity as 
similarity among taxpayers in terms of income, wealth, or consump-
 292 See Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). 
 293 Id. 
 294 See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 
(1989). 
 295 See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 32 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 296 See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266–67 (1989). 
 297 See id. at 267. 
 298 See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 469 (1978). 
 299 See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co. (Electric Storage Battery IV), 329 
U.S. 296, 301 (1946). 
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tion,300 and the definition of systemic horizontal equity similarity 
among taxpayers based upon consistency, regularity, and certainty.301
The preference for systemic horizontal equity is a useful check 
on what could otherwise be an unwieldy, ad hoc approach to the 
resolution of tax disputes.  Systemic horizontal equity analysis allows 
the Court to do what it does best: analyze fairness on the basis of 
readily ascertainable administrative consistency, regularity, and cer-
tainty, rather than on the frequently elusive substantive horizontal 
equity norms of income, wealth, and consumption.  By dividing the 
tax fairness principle of horizontal equity into these two branches, 
the Court ensured that similarly situated taxpayers would be treated 
similarly in the primary areas of judicial concern: consistency, regu-
larity, and certainty. 
In its tax fairness jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause, 
the Court has established the need for preliminary analysis concern-
ing the relationship between taxes paid and services received in 
evaluating vertical tax equity.  While enormously difficult, it seems 
that analysis of this relationship is a necessary precondition to evalua-
tion of progressive taxation.  Such analysis may prove less difficult in 
the future as proxies are found that adequately substitute for detailed 
individual analysis of the value obtained by taxpayers in exchange for 
their tax payments. 
 
 300 See, e.g., Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 641–42 (1975). 
 301 See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 304–06 (1976). 
